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Overview
This thesis will explore the relationship between theory of mind (ToM), context 
processing and schizotypal personality traits. Part one of the thesis is a review of the 
literature related to theory of mind and context processing in schizophrenia, autism 
and schizotypy. The review attempts to determine whether impaired ToM in 
schizophrenia is best understood primarily as due to difficulties associated with a 
defective ToM module, or rather as a consequence of more pervasive difficulties in 
the co-ordination of contextually relevant information (Phillips & Silverstein, 2003). 
Part two of this thesis presents an empirical paper examining ToM and context 
processing in a non-clinical population varying in schizotypy. In particular, task 
performance is examined in relation to group differences between high and low 
schizotypes and associations with analogue symptom profiles. Part 3 is a critical 
appraisal, which provides an opportunity for reflection on the research process.
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Part 1: Literature Review
Theory of Mind, Context Processing and Schizotypy
1. Abstract
C. Frith (1992) proposed that the clinical heterogeneity of schizophrenia could be 
explained by varying degrees of impairment in theory of mind (ToM). The 
development of this model is briefly traced with reference to the literature on autism 
and the empirical evidence discussed. Context processing deficits and their 
relationship to impaired ToM in autism are then introduced. Parallels with 
schizophrenia are explored with regards to the primacy and modularity of impaired 
ToM in schizophrenia. It is tentatively concluded that ToM is a social-cognitive form 
of context processing and that ToM impairments in schizophrenia reflect more 
general impairments in the co-ordination of contextually related information (Phillips 
& Silverstein, 2003). Difficulties with clinical populations are noted and the need for 
further research exploring relations between context processing and ToM using the 
schizotypy paradigm recommended.
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2. Introduction
Schizophrenia is a diagnosis characterised by a wide range of symptoms. Drawing 
analogies with autism, C. Frith (1992) proposed that this clinical heterogeneity could 
be explained by a single deficit in theory of mind (ToM). This review begins by 
introducing the concept of ToM. C. Frith’s (1992) model is briefly described and 
evaluated. The review subsequently continues to illustrate parallels between the 
autism and schizophrenia literature in an attempt to determine whether impaired ToM 
in schizophrenia is best understood primarily as due to difficulties associated with a 
defective ToM module, or rather as a consequence of more pervasive difficulties in 
the co-ordination of contextually relevant information (Phillips & Silverstein, 2003).
The concept of ‘context’ is introduced with reference to central coherence. Weak 
central coherence (WCC) is a context processing deficit characteristic of autism. The 
empirical evidence relating to WCC and its relationship to ToM in autism is reviewed 
first. The concept of ‘context’ in the schizophrenia literature is discussed and the 
evidence appraised. Relationships between context processing deficits and ToM in 
schizophrenia are subsequently evaluated and the theoretical implications considered.
There are difficulties inherent in researching clinical populations. These are discussed 
and the rationale for research using the schizotypy paradigm is proposed. The 
literature relating to schizotypy, impaired ToM and context processing deficits is then 
reviewed. Finally, the need for further research using the schizotypy paradigm to 
evaluate context processing deficits in relation to impaired ToM is recommended.
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Papers for this review were identified through searches of Medline and Psychlnfo, 
using terms including “theory of mind and schizophrenia”; “theory of mind and 
autism”; “theory of mind and schizotypy”; “autism and central coherence”; 
“schizophrenia and central coherence”; “schizophrenia and context”; “schizophrenia 
and perceptual organisation”; “schizophrenia and gestalt”; “schizophrenia and 
cognitive context”; “schizotypy and central coherence”; “schizotypy and context”; 
“schizotypy and perceptual organisation”; “schizotypy and cognitive context” and 
“schizotypy and gestalt”.
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3. Theory of Mind
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to infer mental states (thoughts, beliefs and 
intentions) of oneself and others in order to predict and understand behaviours 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The term ‘theory of mind’ was first used in 
investigations of whether chimpanzees might possess the ability to infer the mental 
states of others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Research has since extended to 
investigate the development of ToM in typically developing children (e. g. Pemer, 
Leekam & Wimmer, 1978) and the possible role of impaired ToM in a range of 
neuropsychiatric disorders, most comprehensively in relation to autism (e. g. Baron- 
Cohen, 1995), schizophrenia (e. g. C. Frith, 1992) and adult patients with frontal lobe 
damage (e. g. Rowe, Bullock, Pollock & Morris, 2001).
3.1 Theoretical Models of ToM
Fodor (1983) proposed that the human mind is organised according to domain- 
specific modules. In keeping with this, Scholl & Leslie (1999) proposed that ToM is 
governed by a specific ToM module (ToMM), which processes information restricted 
to social inference. The module is theorised to comprise an inference-making device 
that is dedicated to inferring mental states from behavioural data using representations 
of an agent’s attitude. Accurate functioning of this module is determined by the 
functioning of a separate mechanism called a Selection Processor (SP), to separate 
relevant from irrelevant context information.
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The ‘simulation’ theory suggests that the ability to infer the mental states of others is 
based on “putting oneself in others’ shoes” (Davies & Stone, 1995). Central to this 
theory is an individual’s ability to attribute their own mental states in a given situation 
to simulate what another person may be thinking or feeling in a similar scenario. At a 
neuronal level, this process may be reflected by the action of mirror neurones, which 
are active when an action is carried out by an individual and when that individual 
observes the same action being carried out by another (Gallese & Goldman, 1998).
Pemer’s (1991) ‘theory-theory’ model suggests that people use a commonsense 
theory of mind akin to a scientific theory. Attributing mental states to others arises 
from theoretical reasoning involving tacitly known causal laws acquired throughout 
development. According to a non-modular account, such reasoning is based upon a 
general-purpose ‘scientizing algorithm’ (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997) whereas modular 
theorists regard it as dependent upon the maturation of a domain specific module 
(Leslie, 1994).
3.2 Theory o f Mind and Autism
The ToM hypothesis of autism proposes that individuals with autism are severely 
delayed in their acquisition of ToM as assessed by their ability to attribute false 
beliefs to others (e. g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie & U. Frith, 1985; Pemer, U. Frith, Leslie 
& Leekam, 1989). Individuals with autism who are able to pass such tasks have been 
found to be impaired on more complex, second order tests of false belief 
understanding (Baron-Cohen, 1989), suggesting ToM delay in the majority of all 
individuals with autism. The ToM hypothesis helps explain many of the behavioural
15
symptoms of autism described by the triad of impairments in socialisation, 
communication and imagination (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Wing & 
Gould, 1979). For example, social withdrawal can be seen to arise from difficulties 
understanding otherwise confusing behaviours in terms of mental states (Baron- 
Cohen, 1992,1995; U. Frith, 1989; U. Frith, Happe & Siddons, 1994).
3.3 Theory o f Mind in Schizophrenia
To date, the most influential model of ToM in schizophrenia has been the modular 
account of C. Frith (1992). This neuropsychological model links psychological 
processes to brain systems. The present review focuses on the psychological level of 
explanation of this model, and the reader is referred to C. Frith (1992) for discussion 
of the neurological level of explanation. Recently, there has also been increased 
interest linking impaired ToM in schizophrenia to domain general processes, 
particularly disorganised symptomatology.
3.3.1 C. Frith’s (1992) Metarepresentational Account o f Psychosis
Similarities exist between the behavioural features of autism and some of the positive 
and negative symptoms of schizophrenia (C. Frith & U. Frith, 1991), which relate to 
symptoms defined as abnormal by their presence and absence respectively (Crow, 
1980). For example, people with both autism and schizophrenia can show negative 
symptoms such as social withdrawal, flat affect and poverty of speech in addition to 
positive symptoms such as inappropriate behaviours, inappropriate speech and 
stereotyped behaviours. Based on these similarities, C. Frith (1992) proposed a model
16
that suggested how varying degrees of ToM impairment could explain the clinical 
heterogeneity of schizophrenia.
C. Frith’s (1992) model distinguished between the observable symptoms of 
schizophrenia, (such as poverty of speech, incoherent speech and social withdrawal) 
called ‘behavioural signs’, and the non-observable symptoms (such as persecutory 
delusions and delusions of reference) referred to as ‘symptoms’. Using this 
classification, C. Frith (1992) made three specific, hierarchical predictions about the 
degree of impairment on tasks assessing ToM. Firstly, individuals with behavioural 
signs were expected to have the most severely impaired performance on the tasks, 
similar to the performance of individuals with autism, as they cannot represent any 
mental states. Secondly, individuals with paranoid symptoms but no behavioural signs 
were predicted to be less impaired than those with behavioural signs but more 
impaired than controls, because it was hypothesised that such individuals were still 
able to represent mental states but to make errors in the process. Thirdly, individuals 
with only passivity symptoms (such as thought insertion) and those in remission, were 
presumed to have no ToM deficit and hence to perform the same as controls.
3.3.2 Disorganised Symptoms & ToM
In contrast to C. Frith’s modular account of psychotic symptoms, Hardy-Bayle (1994) 
suggested that impaired ToM in schizophrenia is itself a manifestation of thought and 
speech disorganisation resulting from defective action planning. Due to an inability 
representing own actions, it is hypothesised that individuals with schizophrenia will 
also have difficulties representing the mental states of others and integrating
17
contextual information (Hardy- Bayle, Sarfati & Passerieux, 2003). According to this 
model, ToM should be most impaired in individuals with schizophrenia who have 
highly disorganised thought, language and communication skills (Andreasen, 1986).
In contrast, patients without disorganisation symptoms would be predicted to have 
preserved ToM abilities.
Disorganised symptoms represent a further symptom grouping that is reliably derived 
by factor analysis of the symptoms of schizophrenia (Liddle, 1987). The DSMIV 
(1994) and other symptom models (Spaulding, Reed, Sullivan, Richardson & Weiler, 
1999) include a separate Disorganisation factor. Confusingly, Disorganisation 
overlaps with C. Frith’s (1992) ‘behavioural signs’ group of symptoms. For example, 
disorganised speech, disorganised behaviour and inappropriate affect would be 
considered positive behavioural signs according to Frith’s classification. However, 
certain negative behavioural signs are distinguishable from disorganised symptoms, 
such as poverty of speech, poverty of action and social withdrawal. This means that it 
should be possible to empirically test Hardy-Bayle’s (1994) and C. Frith’s (1992) 
models.
3.3.3 Empirical Findings
Harrington, Siegert and McClure (2005) and Briine (2005) reviewed 30 and 23 studies 
respectively examining ToM in schizophrenia. Both reviews concluded that there is 
strong evidence for schizophrenia being associated with a deficit in ToM. According 
to Harrington et al. (2005), ToM performance may be influenced by executive 
functioning and IQ, as individuals with schizophrenia can show deficits in executive
18
functioning (e. g. Hutton et al., 1998); and it has been suggested that impaired ToM 
may be compensated for by IQ dependent problem solving skills (Pickup & Frith, 
2001a). A minority of the studies reviewed controlled for this and indicated that 
impaired ToM can be demonstrated independently of these potentially confounding 
variables. However, the evidence regarding associations between impaired ToM and 
particular symptom profiles in schizophrenia is less clear.
3.3.3.1 Testing C. Frith’s Modular Model
Studies have generally found the strongest evidence for an association between the 
presence of behavioural signs and impaired representation of others’ mental states (e. 
g. Pickup & Frith, 2001). There is less clarity with regards to C. Frith’s (1992) 
predictions regarding paranoid symptoms, with some studies showing the predicted 
pattern of impairment (e. g. Corcoran, Mercer & C. Frith, 1995) and others not (e. g. 
Grieg, Bryson & Bell, 2004). Equally, some studies have shown that patients in 
remission have intact ToM (e. g. Corcoran, mercer & C. Frith, 1995), but some have 
shown patients in remission to be as impaired as those with schizophrenia (Randall, 
Corcoran, Day & Bentall, 2003).
The above findings are largely reflected in a study by Pickup & Frith (2001a). ToM 
was assessed using a second-order false belief task based on Pemer & Wimmer’s 
(1985) ‘ice-cream van’ story in which participants were required to attribute a story 
character’s false belief about another character’s belief. Participants with 
schizophrenia were grouped hierarchically according to C. Frith’s (1992) model based 
on their symptomatology on the day of testing as measured by a Present State
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Examination (PSE; Wing et al., 1974). Participants with symptoms or signs from 
more than one group were allocated to the group for which poorer task performance 
was predicted. Participants with schizophrenia in the behavioural signs group had 
more impaired ToM than a non-psychotic clinical control group and a non-clinical 
control group, even when memory and IQ were controlled for. Pickup & C. Frith 
(2001) found some evidence supporting C. Frith’s (1992) prediction about paranoid 
symptoms, although the effect was small and not robust when IQ was co-varied. In 
keeping with C. Frith’s (1992) model, a subgroup of individuals with remitted 
schizophrenia and a single case with only passivity symptoms had intact ToM.
3.33.2 Testing Non-Modular Models
Some studies have shown the most impaired ToM performance, in terms of 
representing others’ mental states, to be associated with high levels of thought and 
language disorganisation (e. g. Sarfati & Hardy-Bayle, 1999; Schenkel, Spaulding & 
Silverstein, 2005). Schenkel et al. (2005) assessed ToM with regards to representing 
others’ mental states in a group of individuals with schizophrenia using the Hinting 
Task (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995).This task comprises stories depicting 
interactions between two characters in which one drops the other a hint. The aim of 
the task is to explain what the hint intended to communicate. Schenkel et al. (2005) 
assessed symptoms in their sample using the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; 
Ventura, Green, Shaner & Liberman, 1993), providing scores for six factors: 
Emotional Blunting, Psychotic Disorganisation, Hallucinations/Delusions, Paranoia, 
Agitation/Elation and Anxiety/Depression. This symptom classification allowed the 
relationship between disorganised symptoms and ToM to be differentiated from C.
20
Frith’s positive and negative behavioural signs that do not relate to disorganisation (e. 
g. motor hyperactivity, motor retardation, blunted affect and emotional withdrawal). 
Only the Psychotic Disorganisation factor significantly correlated with impaired ToM 
performance in Schenkel et al.’s (2005) study supporting Hardy-Bayle’s non-modular 
account of ToM deficits in schizophrenia resulting from disorganised 
symptomatology.
Other studies have less clearly supported associations between disorganised 
symptomatology and schizophrenia. Mazza et al. (2001) found that individuals with 
schizophrenia and psychomotor poverty performed worse on first and second order 
tests of ToM than individuals with disorganised schizophrenia. Brune (2003) also 
reported that individuals with disorganised schizophrenia were not more impaired on 
picture sequencing tasks measuring first and second order ToM than controls once IQ 
was controlled for.
3.3.3.3 Explanations for Conflicting Results
Harrington et al. (2005) discussed how conflicting results in studies investigating 
ToM in schizophrenia could reflect methodological differences in sub-grouping the 
symptoms of schizophrenia. Another possible reason identified in their review is the 
variety of ToM tasks, which are likely to assess different aspects of ToM, such as first 
and second order false beliefs, deception, desires, intentions and jokes. Another 
weakness identified is that many ToM tasks have not been psychometrically 
evaluated. Few studies have controlled for IQ and executive functioning, meaning that 
results might be influenced by these potentially confounding variables. There are also
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problems inherent in using clinical groups that will be discussed later as part of the 
rationale for research using the schizotypy paradigm.
3.4 Summary
Similarities between the features of autism and schizophrenia suggested that both 
disorders may be characterised by a primary deficit in ToM. C. Frith’s (1992) model 
described how varying degrees of ToM impairment could differentially explain the 
clinical heterogeneity of schizophrenia. In contrast to this primarily modular account, 
Hardy-Bayle (1994) proposed that impaired ToM in schizophrenia is a function of 
disorganised symptomatology. Empirical evidence for and against both models can be 
found. Further research is needed to help determine which symptom profiles of 
schizophrenia are associated with impaired ToM and to accurately control for IQ and 
executive functioning.
4. Weak Central Coherence: Impaired Perceptual Organisation in Autism
Human information processing is generally characterised by a desire to achieve high- 
level meaning. U. Frith (1989) called this ‘central coherence’. Weak central 
coherence (WCC) refers to the inverse cognitive style where there is a preference for 
detailed/local rather than global processing. Such deficits in perceptual organisation 
have been found to be common in autism (U. Frith, 1989) and have also been related 
to ToM as discussed below.
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The concept of weak central coherence was first developed in the autism literature. U. 
Frith (1989) noted that the strengths and weaknesses of individuals with autism on a 
range of tasks suggested that the disorder may be characterised by perceptual 
organisation deficits that favour local over global contextual processing.
WCC can account for poor performance on tasks where context integration is 
required. For example, U. Frith & Snowling (1983) found that children with autism 
were more likely to pronounce the common version of a homograph irrespective of 
the context information contained in the sentence. Children with autism have also 
been shown to be less susceptible to visual illusions which are based upon integrating 
elements of the illusion into their inducing context (Happe, 1996; Ropar & Mitchell, 
1999).
A number of studies have failed to confirm the WCC hypothesis in the autism 
literature (Brian & Bryson, 1996; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Hoy, Hatton 
& Hare, 2004). A common feature of these studies is the inclusion of participants with 
a wide variety of diagnoses, including Asperger syndrome and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified. It is possible that WCC may only 
be apparent in studies where participants have a diagnosis of autism (Burnette et al., 
2005). Further strong support for the notion of WCC is provided by studies in which a 
local information processing bias provides an advantage on task performance. For 
example, individuals with autism have been shown to be faster than matched controls 
at the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971), where 
individual shapes have to be found within a larger pattern (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1997). Similarly, Shah and Frith (1993) demonstrated that individuals with autism 
were faster at the standard Block Design task than matched controls. Here, patterns
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have to be constructed from an example stimulus using either four or nine blocks 
containing components of the patterns. Such studies discount a generalised deficit 
explanation of test performance in autism, which might explain demonstrations of 
impaired performance in terms of factors such as reduced motivation and attention 
(Chapman & Chapman, 1978).
5. Relationships between Theory of Mind and Weak Central Coherence
Given the co-occurrence of deficits in both ToM and WCC in autism, relationships 
between the two have been investigated. This work has also been extended to the 
general population.
5.1 Autism
U. Frith (1989) argued for the primacy of WCC, stating that a ToM deficit could 
result from a failure to integrate relevant information from a variety of sources and 
that a weak drive for a “meaningful” integration of information was the “central 
cognitive dysfunction” associated with autism (U. Frith, 1989, p. 174). U. Frith 
(1989) went on to make the link between ToM and WCC even more explicit, 
describing ToM as “a cohesive interpretative device par excellence: it forces together 
complex information from totally disparate sources” (p. 174).
U. Frith & Happe (1994) later changed this position. In keeping with a modular model 
of ToM, they suggested that the WCC and ToM hypotheses explained different 
aspects of autism reflecting two separate mechanisms. They cited how individuals
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with autism who passed complex second-order-ToM tasks still demonstrated WCC on 
Block Design. Jarrold, Butler, Cottington & Jimenez’s (2000) study supported U. 
Frith’s (1989) original proposition. They compared a sample of typically developing 
five-year-old children with a sample of primary school aged children with autism 
using a range of standard ToM tasks and assessed WCC using Block Design and the 
Embedded Figures Test. When verbal mental age was controlled for, there was an 
inverse relationship between performance on the ToM tasks and the WCC tasks in 
both groups, indicating that people who were better at ToM also had strong central 
coherence. More recently, Burnette et al. (2005) reported that performance on Block 
Design and tests of first and second order ToM were unrelated in a sample of children 
with high functioning autism, but that performance on their verbal measure of WCC, 
the homograph task (Frith & Snowling, 1986), was related to ToM, suggesting a 
relationship between the two.
5.2 General Population
Baron-Cohen & Hammer (1997) found evidence of a link between WCC and ToM in 
a study of adults from the general population. They assessed ToM using their ‘Eyes 
Test’ in which participants have to judge how people might be feeling or what they 
might be thinking from a series of pictures of peoples’ eyes. WCC was assessed 
through the Embedded Figures Test. They found that women were significantly better 
than men on the Eyes Test, but that men were significantly better on the Embedded 
Figures Test. This opposite pattern of sex differences on the two tasks suggested that 
individuals performing well on one task tend to perform worse on the other. Baron- 
Cohen & Hammer (1997) concluded that “weak central coherence may go hand in
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hand with impaired mind-reading” (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997, p.550). Jarrold et 
al. (2000) also found an inverse relationship between performance on the Embedded 
Figures Test and the Eyes Task in a sample of adults from the general population.
5.3 Theoretical Implications
The literature discussed above suggesting relations between ToM and WCC casts 
doubt upon modular conceptions of ToM, as it suggests that ToM is influenced by 
non-social perceptual biases. This conflicts with the concept of domain specificity 
required by modular systems.
5.4 Summary
There is some evidence from individuals with autism and the general population 
which suggest that ToM and WCC are linked. It could be that aspects of social 
information processing require the integration of information, such as the ability to 
process faces (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983), or context-dependent language (Happe, 
1997). Jarrold (2000) suggested that strong central coherence is important to ToM 
development as it biases the developing individual to take a global view of a situation 
and to integrate what the individual and another person are attending to. In this 
respect, an individual with WCC might fail to integrate separate cues into a 
meaningful representation of the global social situation.
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6. Weak Central Coherence & Schizophrenia: Contextual Processing Deficits
A similar perceptual processing bias to that found in autism has been reported in 
schizophrenia (Uhlhaas & Silverstein, 2005). However, the term WCC is rarely used 
in the schizophrenia literature, but the concept is integrated into a more encompassing 
notion of ‘context processing deficits’.
6.1 Definitions of Context
The word “context” is derived from the Latin “contexere” -  to weave together. 
Different definitions of ‘context’ have been emphasised in the schizophrenia 
literature. Cohen & Servan-Schreiber (1992) identify context with task-relevant 
information, supplied by preceding events, that is manipulated in working memory 
according to task requirements. Others identify context more with the activation of 
information in long term memory, which leads to response biases to facilitate task- 
efficient behaviour (e.g. Gray, Feldon, Rawlings, Hemsley & Smith, 1991). In both of 
these definitions, context is seen to exert a top-down influence upon perception and 
cognition. Phillips & Silverstein (2003) proposed that bottom-up stimulus driven 
contextual information interacts with this top-down contextual information. Park, Lee, 
Folley and Kim (2003) elaborated on this to define the various components of context 
more generally in terms of perceptual context and cognitive context.
Perceptual context refers to three levels:
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i) Context present in the form of the unattended features of a target stimulus. 
For example, if colour is the target feature, shape and texture may be part 
of the context.
ii) Context provided by items surrounding the target stimulus. For example, 
perceptual grouping may influence the processing of the target.
iii) Context provided by the temporal relationship between the target event 
and the contextual background. For example, lexical disambiguation is 
dependent upon the temporal relationship between target and context.
Cognitive context refers to two levels:
i) Long-term memory, skills and habits provide a cognitive context. This is 
evident in semantic priming tasks where the speed of lexical decision 
making is influenced by experiences and associations held in long-term 
memory.
ii) Task-relevant information in working memory, such as instructions, 
provides context. This is demonstrated in the AX-type Continuous 
Performance Task (described below) in which participants must respond to 
an X only if it follows an A.
6.2 Empirical Findings
A number of studies have investigated perceptual and cognitive context processing in
schizophrenia. They have tended to refer to either perceptual or cognitive context.
However, it is felt that Phillips & Silverstein’s (2003) notion of interactions between
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these two levels makes this distinction rather artificial. For example, task instructions 
are referred to as cognitive context in the above definition, and in this respect, all 
experimental paradigms involve some cognitive context. Studies reported as 
‘perceptual’ or ‘cognitive’ in nature will be discussed separately below for clarity 
although interactions between the two should be held in mind.
6.2.1 Impaired Perceptual Context
Uhlhaas & Silverstein (2005) found that 85% of the studies included in their review 
of the literature indicated impaired perceptual organisation in schizophrenia. The most 
consistent finding was that perceptual organisation manifested as reduced 
responsiveness to the organisational qualities of stimuli. When symptom profiles were 
explored, impaired context processing was particularly associated with disorganised 
symptoms.
Uhlhaas et al. (2006) assessed the influence of concurrent visual context on 
perception using a computerised version of the Visual Size Perception Test (Phillips, 
Chapman & Berry, 2004), which is based on the Ebbinghaus illusion. In this task, 
surrounding context circles induce a size distortion on central target circles so that 
good performance in judging the size of the targets depends on the ability to ignore 
context. As predicted, Uhlhaas et al. (2006) found that participants with schizophrenia 
were more accurate at this task than a non-psychotic psychiatric control group. 
Furthermore, when participants with schizophrenia were divided into disorganised 
and non-disorganised groups, those with disorganised schizophrenia had the best 
performance, indicative of the most impaired context processing.
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6.2.2 Impaired Cognitive Context
Deficits in context processing primarily relating to more top down, post-attentive 
processes have also been experimentally demonstrated in schizophrenia. Studies have 
typically adapted paradigms designed to assess executive function and selective 
attention, including the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (Gold, Carpenter, Randolph, 
Goldberg, & Weinberger, 1997); the Stroop task (Cohen, Barch, Carter & Servan- 
Schreiber, 1999) and the Continuous Performance Task (Elvevag, Duncan & 
McKenna, 2000). Such tasks have been adapted to vary the demand placed on the 
internal representation of cognitive context via the complexity of contextual 
information required to be maintained in memory, the strength of task irrelevant 
responses (such as automatic responses) to be ignored, and the delay between context 
and response. Impaired contextual processing in individuals with schizophrenia in 
these studies is generally demonstrated through worse performance than controls in 
conditions where accurate use of context is required and better performance than 
controls in conditions where context provides misleading information. As with 
perceptual context processing, such impairments have been associated with 
disorganised symptoms (e. g. Cohen et al., 1999).
Cohen et al. (1999) used the Continuous Performance Task (CPT) to demonstrate 
impaired processing of cognitive context in schizophrenia. The CPT is a visual 
vigilance task in which a series of sequentially presented single numbers or letters are 
monitored. Cohen et al.’s (1999) task required participants to respond to a target ‘X’ 
only when it was preceded by an ‘A’ and not a ‘B’. A strong tendency to respond to 
an X was established by the majority of trials being the target sequence (AX). An
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inappropriate expectancy bias was also introduced in which an ‘A’ was followed by a 
‘Y \ Healthy and depressed control participants made more errors in this expectancy 
bias condition compared to the simple AX/BX conditions. In contrast, participants 
with schizophrenia showed the opposite pattern of results. They made more errors in 
the AX and BX conditions, but not in the AY condition. In the former, impaired 
processing of cognitive context in terms of the accurate maintenance of task 
instructions resulted in more errors, where as in the latter, it resulted in less. Cohen et 
al. (1999) found that impaired contextual processing was associated with higher levels 
of disorganised symptomatology and could be dissociated from short term memory 
impairments.
6.3 Phenomenological Experience of Context Processing Deficits
The experimental evidence cited above indicating disrupted context processing has 
been related to the phenomenological experience of schizophrenia. Matussek 
(1952/1987) believed the perceptual world of individuals with schizophrenia was 
characterised by a splitting of individual perceptual components from their natural 
context. Hemsley (2005) also noted how impaired processing of cognitive context 
might explain the experience of schizophrenic symptoms such as delusional thinking. 
For example, the failure of context to activate appropriate stored material could result 
in delusional beliefs being inferred on the basis of a single co-occurrence due to past 
regularities not being processed.
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6.4 Summary
There is good evidence to indicate impaired processing of perceptual and cognitive 
context in schizophrenia. Experimental manipulations in which impaired context 
processing results in enhanced task performance indicate that such deficits cannot be 
explained by a general deficit model in which task performance is accounted for by 
other illness-related disabling factors such as apathy or inattention. As with impaired 
ToM task performance in schizophrenia, such deficits have been found to be 
associated with disorganised symptoms, suggesting both impairments may be related.
7. Relationships between context processing deficits and theory of mind in 
schizophrenia
Context processing deficits have been shown to be particularly marked in individuals 
with poor premorbid social functioning. For example, Silverstein et al. (1996) 
investigated perceptual context processing in individuals with schizophrenia using an 
adaptation of Banks & Prinzmetal’s (1976) visual search task. Participants had to 
report whether a ‘T’ or an ‘F’ was present in an array consisting of T-F hybrids that 
were perceptually grouped with noise elements to vary task difficulty. In the difficult 
condition, a serial search process was required. In the easier conditions, the noise 
elements were grouped together separately from the target. Impaired context 
processing in individuals with schizophrenia classified as having poor premorbid 
social functioning (identified by an adaptation of Phillips’ (1953) scale of premorbid 
social adjustment) was shown by their faster performance on the difficult condition 
compared to individuals with schizophrenia and good premorbid social functioning.
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Intact ToM has been linked to better overall social functioning in schizophrenia 
(Roncone, Falloon & Mazza, 2002), suggesting that context processing deficits may 
impact upon ToM. Green, Uhlhaas & Coltheart (2005) suggested how deficits in 
context processing could lead to reduced social competence at an early age in people 
generally. In particular, they noted how context processing is necessary for the 
deciphering of biological motion perception, which may play an important role in the 
development, acquisition and maintenance of ToM (Blakemore & Decety, 2001).
7.1 Empirical Evidence
To date, three published studies have directly investigated relations between ToM and 
context processing in schizophrenia. Uhlhaas et al (2006) compared the performance 
of individuals with schizophrenia to controls on three measures of ToM: a first-order 
ToM task (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983), the ‘Hinting Task’ (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 
1995) and the ‘Eyes Test’ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). 
Context processing was assessed using the Visual Size Perception Test described 
above. Symptomatology of participants with schizophrenia was assessed using the 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS: Kay, Opler & Fiszbein, 1987) and 
then subsequently grouped into six factors: Disorganised, Positive, Negative, 
Excitement, Cognitive and Depression. Uhlhaas et al. (2006) found significant 
negative correlations between performance on the visual size perception task, the 
Hinting Task and a composite ToM score. This suggests that reduced sensitivity to 
surrounding visual context was associated with impaired performance on ToM tasks. 
The Cognitive Disorganisation factor was the only symptom group consistently
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correlated with impairments in perceptual context processing as well as the composite 
ToM score.
Schenkel, Spaulding & Silverstein (2005) investigated ToM in individuals with 
schizophrenia using the Hinting Task (Corcoran et al., 1995), which assesses the 
ability to infer the intentions behind indirect speech utterances. Performance on this 
task was compared with two measures of context processing: the Contour Integration 
Test (Kovacs, Kozma, Feher & Benedek, 1999) and a modified version of the Hayling 
Sentence Completion Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). In the latter task, the scoring 
system was modified so that each response was classified according to a four point 
scale ranging from 1 (not appropriate) to 4 (appropriate). The Contour Integration 
Test requires a circular contour of elements to be identified from a background of 
elements. Impaired ToM performance was associated with impaired context 
processing in both tasks. Control measures indicated that executive and general 
intellectual functioning could not explain this association. Impaired ToM and context 
processing deficits were both significantly associated with the Psychotic 
Disorganisation factor of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Ventura, Green, 
Shaner & Liberman, 1993), but not with any of the other five factors.
Penn, Ritchie, Francis, Combs & Martin (2002) investigated context processing in 
schizophrenia across a range of tasks assessing social cognition. Two of these tasks 
required ToM. The Gilbert-Pelham Task (GPT; Gilbert, Pelham & Krull, 1988) 
requires participants to watch a silent video of a woman who appears anxious. The 
images are accompanied by subtitles that provide context information regarding 
topics that are either congruent with anxiety (e. g. public humiliation) or not (e. g.
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fashion trends). Participants are then required to rate the woman’s trait and state 
anxiety in various social situations. High and low ratings of trait and state anxiety 
following the incongruent and congruent context conditions respectively are 
hypothesised to reflect effective use of context, as high levels of anxiety in the 
congruent, but not incongruent, conditions would be expected. The Situation 
Matching Task (SMT: Ferman, 1993) requires participants to match the emotion 
displayed by a target cartoon character across different contexts. As expected, Penn et 
al. (2002) found that individuals with schizophrenia did not utilise context in these 
tasks. However, the same was true for healthy control participants. Different reasons 
for this finding in the two groups were suggested. Control participants appeared to 
choose not to use context information, but individuals with schizophrenia appeared 
preoccupied with the context rather than not processing it. Another possibility is that 
the measures used were of questionable validity in assessing context processing in 
social cognition. Penn et al. (2002) did find some evidence from their measures 
indicating an association between impaired social context processing and reduced 
social competence on the ward as assessed by the Nurse’s Observation Scale for 
Inpatient Evaluation (NOSIE-30; Hongfield, Gillis & Klett, 1996).
7.2 Summary
Reflecting research in autism, there is evidence to suggest that impaired ToM in 
schizophrenia may be related to impaired context processing. There is some evidence 
that both impairments are associated with disorganised symptoms, which suggests 
that ToM may be a social cognitive form of context processing (Silverstein &
Phillips, 2003) and that disorganised symptoms are the clinical manifestation of a
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more generalised disorganisation in the co-ordination of contextually related 
information (Uhlhaas et al., 2006). Such a notion is contrary to modular models of 
ToM and calls into question the primacy of a deficit in ToM in explaining the 
symptoms of schizophrenia.
8. Difficulties Researching Clinical Populations
When interpreting results from clinical samples, findings may be influenced by a host 
of potentially confounding factors including medication, heterogeneity of the samples, 
poor motivation, small sample sizes etc (Abdi & Sharma, 2004). Such variables could 
explain the inconsistent results regarding which symptoms of schizophrenia are 
associated with impaired ToM. Additionally, the conceptual validity of impaired ToM 
in schizophrenia is questioned when one considers that it might be an artefact of the 
institutionalisation, social withdrawal and alienation typical of severe and enduring 
mental health problems (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999). These crucial issues suggest 
that other paradigms are needed to advance research in this area.
8.1 Schizotypy
To address the issues raised above, clinical research can be complemented by testing 
healthy individuals in the general population who show sub-clinical features of 
schizophrenia expressed as part of the normal diversity of personality. Many studies 
indicate that psychosis-like symptoms and experiences are apparent in the general 
population, suggesting a continuity model of psychosis (for review, see Myin- 
Germeys, Krabbendam & van Os, 2003). ‘Schizotypy’ is a term that relates to such a
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continuity model. It acknowledges the presence of psychotic-like features in the 
general, non-clinical population, such as belief in telepathy and magic (Claridge & 
Beech, 1995). According to the continuity model, the clinical symptoms of psychosis 
are considered as extreme manifestations of these variations in the general population, 
with those in the general population high in schizotypy resembling individuals with 
psychosis most closely. In this respect, the study of non-clinical individuals high in 
schizotypy can facilitate our understanding of schizophrenia.
8.2 Schizotypy and Theory of Mind
Three published studies have examined the relationship between schizotypy and ToM. 
Langdon & Coltheart (1999) examined the performance of healthy, non-clinical 
participants on a picture-story sequencing task. Participants’ degree of schizotypy was 
assessed using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991) which 
measures 3 schizotypy factors: Cognitive-Perceptual, Interpersonal and Disorganised. 
The stories consisted of a series of cartoon pictures that had to be ordered so as to tell 
a meaningful story. They depicted either ‘mechanical’, ‘social - script’ or ‘false 
belief scenarios. ‘Mechanical’ stories depicted sequences of physical cause and effect 
events and tested the ability to infer causal relations. ‘Social-script’ stories depicted 
people carrying out everyday social routines and tested ability to reason logically 
using social-script knowledge. ToM was assessed through ‘False Belief’ stories, 
which featured a character who acted on the basis of information that participants 
knew to be false.
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In keeping with their hypothesis, Langdon & Coltheart (1999) found that high 
schizotypes performed significantly poorer on the ToM task relative to low 
schizotypes. There were no significant group differences on the other story tasks. 
Langdon & Coltheart (1999) had expected impaired ToM to be associated with the 
psychotic-like Cognitive-Perceptual factor (magical thinking, unusual perceptual 
experiences). However, only the Interpersonal factor (including suspiciousness and 
paranoia, social anxiety, few friends and constricted affect) was associated with 
impaired ToM. There were no differences in scores on the Disorganised or Cognitive- 
Perceptual factors.
Langdon & Coltheart (1999) conducted an extended replication of the above study to 
control for executive functioning and ceiling effects with the ToM task by including a 
computerised version of the Tower of London task, taken from the Cambridge 
Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB), and set of ‘capture’ stories, 
which were harder than the ‘false belief stories. In keeping with the first part of their 
study, high schizotypes were characterised by poor theory of mind relative to low 
schizotypes, but there were no differences on the other story types, including the 
‘capture’ stories. This difference could not be explained by executive planning 
deficits as there were no differences in performance between high and low 
schizotypes on the Tower of London task. However, contrary to the first part of their 
study, impaired ToM was associated with the Cognitive-Perceptual and Disorganised 
factors of the SPQ. Langdon & Coltheart (1999) relate this finding to possible 
differences in the two samples used.
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In a later study, Langdon & Coltheart (2004) found that high schizotypes were more 
impaired at understanding irony than low schizotypes, and that this effect was 
particularly associated with the Cognitive-Perceptual factor of the SPQ. There were 
no differences in performance on a metaphor task, a finding which corresponds with 
the view that understanding irony is a task that requires a higher level of ToM than 
does metaphor (Happe, 1993).
Pickup (2006) assessed ToM in schizotypy using Fletcher et al’s (1995) story task. 
Schizotypy was assessed using the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and 
Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason, Claridge & Jackson, 1995). This questionnaire 
measures four factors: ‘Unusual Experiences’; ‘Cognitive Disorganisation’;
‘Impulsive Nonconformity’ and ‘Introvertive Anhedonia’. The story task comprised 
16 short passages of text, which were each followed by a question. There were 8 ToM 
stories and 8 control ‘physical’ stories, which did not require mental state attribution. 
As additional control measures, IQ and executive function were also assessed.
Contrary to what was expected, Pickup (2006b) found no significant association 
between ToM performance and total schizotypy scores. Equally, there were no 
significant differences in ToM performance according to schizotypal traits analogous 
to C. Frith’s (1992) behavioural signs or those allocated to a ‘no symptom’ group. 
However, a regression analysis indicated that high scores on the Unusual Experiences 
factor of the O-LIFE predicted poorer ToM when verbal IQ and executive function 
were controlled for. No association was found with scores on the ‘physical’ stories, 
indicating that this relationship was specific to ToM. This finding was reported as
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providing some evidence that experiences analogous to the paranoid symptoms of 
schizotypy are associated with poorer ToM.
Pickup (2006) suggested that differences in the item weightings in the SPQ and O- 
LIFE could explain why there was no difference between high and low schizotypes on 
ToM scores using the O-LIFE, but there was such a difference using the SPQ in the 
study by Langdon & Coltheart (1999). The SPQ is weighted in favour of items that 
correspond to the Unusual Experiences factor of the O-LIFE. In this respect, it is 
possible that Langdon & Coltheart’s (1999) finding reflects the association found in 
the regression analysis by Pickup (2006). Another reason suggested for the lack of 
association between total schizotypy scores and ToM relates to the task 
administration. Pickup (2006) proposed that making the task more ‘on-line’ by having 
the stories read aloud to participants might make the task more sensitive to between- 
subject differences.
8.3 Summary
There is some evidence that ToM is impaired in healthy, non-clinical individuals who 
are high in schizotypy. This confirms that ToM impairments in schizophrenia cannot 
be considered an artefact of the chronic associality that is typical of severe and 
enduring mental health problems. There is less clarity regarding the symptom profiles 
associated with impaired ToM in schizotypy, with evidence for schizotypal traits 
analogous to disorganised, paranoid and negative symptoms being associated with 
ToM impairments. These differences may be partly explained by differences in the 
measures used to group symptom profiles.
40
8.4 Schizotypy and Context Processing Deficits
Several studies have investigated perceptual context processing in schizotypy but few 
have explicitly examined cognitive context.
8.4.1 Perceptual Context
Rawlings & Claridge (1984) investigated the performance of individuals high and low 
in schizotypy on the Navon (1977) letter identification task, in which the dependent 
variable is reaction time to identify pointilistic renditions of letters made up of smaller 
letters. Participants were requested to respond to either the global or local form. Intact 
context processing is indicated by a preference for global information, referred to as a 
‘global precedence’ effect by Navon (1977). This global precedence effect is also 
evident in involuntary interference from the global-to-local level but not from the 
local-to-global level. Rawlings & Claridge (1984) found that individuals high in 
schizotypy showed an advantage over those low in schizotypy in processing local 
information, suggesting impaired contextual processing. After controlling for IQ, but 
not executive functioning, this local information processing advantage has been 
associated with high scores on the Unusual Experiences and Cognitive 
Disorganisation factors of the O-LIFE (Goodarzi, Wykes & Hemsley, 2000).
Tsakanikos & Reed (2003) measured contextual processing using the Hidden Figures 
Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman & Dermen, 1976) in which participants have to 
identify which one of five simple figures is hidden in a complex visual configuration. 
In this respect, it is similar to the adult version of the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin
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et al., 1971). Tsakanikos & Reed (2003) predicted that participants high in schizotypy 
would perform worse on this task compared to those low in schizotypy. This is in 
conflict with the literature base on context processing deficits discussed above, 
linking schizophrenia to enhanced performance on tasks that favour a local processing 
style. Tsakanikos & Reed (2003) suggested that schizophrenia is associated with poor 
top-down processing, and proposed that top-down processing is required for figure- 
ground segregation. The results of their study were mixed. Enhanced performance, 
indicative of context processing deficits, was associated with high scores on the 
‘Impulsive Non-Conformity’ scale of the O-LIFE, but high scores on the ‘Introvertive 
Anhedonia’ scale were associated with poorer performance.
Contrary to their predictions, Pickup & Frith (2001b) found no differences between 
high and low schizotypes on a modified version of the Embedded Figures Task 
(Pickup, 1997), and no significant associations between task performance and factor 
scores of the O-LIFE. It is possible that context processing deficits in schizotypy are 
not very pronounced (Silverstein, Raulin, Pristach & Pomerantz, 1992) and that 
Pickup’s (1997) modified version of the Embedded Figures Task was not sensitive 
enough to detect any subtle differences.
Uhlhaas, Silverstein, Phillips & Lovell (2004) assessed visual context processing in 
individuals assessed for schizotypy and thought disorder as measured by the SPQ 
(Raine et al., 1991) and the short form of the Thought Disorder Index (TDI) 
(Carpenter, Coleman, Watemaux & Perry, 1993) respectively. Visual context 
processing was assessed through the Contour Integration Task and the Visual Size 
Perception Task described earlier. It was hypothesised that compared to low
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schizotypes, context processing deficits in high schizotypes would be evident in 
impaired performance on the Contour Integration Task and enhanced performance on 
the visual size perception task. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that such context 
processing deficits would be associated with the disorganised symptoms of 
schizotypy and hence particularly evident in positively thought disordered 
participants. They found no significant differences in total scores between high and 
low schizotypes on either of the context processing tasks and no significant 
associations between the individual factors of the SPQ and performance on these 
tasks. However, the expected pattern of results was found when the analyses were 
repeated comparing high schizotypes who were also high in thought disorder with 
high schizotypes low in thought disorder and low schizotypes (who were not assessed, 
but assumed to be low in thought disorder). This suggests that high schizotypy 
combined with high thought disorder may be a more sensitive measure of 
disorganisation than schizotypy alone in the non-clinical population.
8.4.2 Cognitive Context
Few studies have directly investigated cognitive context processing in relation to 
schizotypy. Using the Perceptual Aberration Scale, (Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 
1978), Park, Holzman & Lenzenweger (1995) compared the performance of high and 
low schizotypes on an oculmotor memory task in which participants had to indicate 
the location of a visually presented target with their eyes. Cognitive context was 
manipulated by varying the delay between presentation of the target and participants’ 
responses, and the inclusion of a distracter stimulus. Compared to a control task, in 
which the target was present throughout the task, individuals high in schizotypy had
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poorer performance indicative of impaired cognitive context in the more demanding 
cognitive context conditions than low schizotypes
8.5 Summary
As with the literature discussed above in relation to autism and schizophrenia, there is 
some evidence to suggest that healthy, non-clinical individuals high in schizotypy, 
specifically those also high in thought disorder, have perceptual contextual processing 
deficits. The effect may be less pronounced in non-clinical samples, emphasising the 
need for sensitive tests of context processing. Although some studies have controlled 
for IQ, few have controlled for executive functioning. Future studies should carefully 
control for both, as executive functioning has been shown to vary with schizotypy 
(Raine, Sheard, Reynolds & Lencz, 1992).
9. Conclusions and Future Directions
There are strong parallels between ToM research in the fields of autism and 
schizophrenia. There is good evidence that ToM is impaired in schizophrenia and in 
individuals who are high in schizotypy. There is however less clarity regarding which 
symptom profiles are associated with impaired ToM.
In addition to impaired ToM, autism, schizophrenia and high schizotypy have also 
been associated with perceptual and cognitive context processing deficits. There is 
some evidence of a relationship between impaired ToM and contextual processing 
deficits in the general population, in schizophrenia and in individuals who are high
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schizotypy, which challenges notions of both the primacy and modularity of a ToM 
deficit. To account for this relationship, it has been suggested that ToM is a social- 
cognitive form of context processing and that impaired ToM is one consequence of a 
larger impairment in the co-ordination of contextually relevant material (Phillips & 
Silverstein, 2003) clinically manifested in the disorganised features of schizophrenia 
(Uhlhaas et al., 2006).
Only three studies have directly investigated relationships between impaired ToM and 
contextual processing deficits in schizophrenia. To date, no studies have investigated 
relationships between ToM and context processing deficits using the schizotypy 
paradigm. Given the difficulties discussed above concerning research with clinical 
samples, such research would help clarify the nature of any relationship and is a 
priority in this field.
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Part 2: Clinical Paper
Theory of Mind, Context Processing and Schizotypy
1. Abstract
Investigations have demonstrated impaired theory of mind (ToM) in schizophrenia, 
but little is known about the mechanisms associated with such impairment. Using the 
schizotypy paradigm, the present study examined the proposal that impaired ToM is 
associated with impaired context processing. 80 participants varying in schizotypy 
completed a schizotypy questionnaire (the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings 
and Experiences; O-LIFE), the Thought Disorder Index (TDI), two ToM tasks (a 
picture-story sequencing task and the Eyes Test) and two perceptual context 
processing tasks (Block Design and the Hidden Figures Test). Executive functioning 
was assessed using the Brixton test, non-verbal IQ was assessed using the Test of 
Non-Verbal Intelligence -  3rd edition (TONI-3) and verbal IQ was assessed using the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). The non-significant findings of 
this study are discussed in relation to previous studies and the need for further 
extended replications.
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Introduction
2.1 Theory of Mind & Schizophrenia
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to infer mental states of oneself and others 
in order to predict and understand behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Impaired 
ToM has been proposed as an explanation for the behavioural features of autism (e. g. 
Baron-Cohen, 1992; U. Frith, 1989). Based on similarities observed between such 
features and some of the symptoms of schizophrenia, C. Frith (1992) proposed a 
model that explained the clinical heterogeneity of schizophrenia in terms of varying 
degrees of impairment in ToM. Numerous studies have explored ToM in 
schizophrenia (for reviews, see Briine, 2005; Harrington, Siegert & McClure, 2005). 
The overall finding from these studies confirms that ToM is impaired in 
schizophrenia, but uncertainty remains regarding which symptom profiles of 
schizophrenia are associated with impaired ToM and, more specifically, whether such 
impairment is best explained by modular (Fodor, 1983; Scholl & Leslie, 1999) or 
non-modular accounts of the human mind (e. g. Pemer, 1991; Davies & Stone, 1995).
2.2 C. Frith’s (1992) Metarepresentational Account of Psychosis
C. Frith’s (1992) proposed three specific, hierarchical predictions based on a 
classification of symptoms into those which can be observed and those which cannot, 
referred to as ‘behavioural signs’ and ‘symptoms’ respectively. Firstly, behavioural 
signs (e. g. motor retardation, incoherence and poverty of speech) were hypothesised 
to reflect the most severe impairments of ToM, similar to those found in autism.
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Secondly, individuals with paranoid symptoms (e. g. persecutory delusions and 
delusions of reference) were predicted to be less impaired than those with behavioural 
signs, but more impaired than controls. This is because such individuals were 
theorised to represent mental states of others, but erroneously. Finally, those with 
passivity symptoms (e. g. thought insertion and delusions of control) and those in 
remission were expected to have intact attribution of others’ mental states. C. Frith’s 
(1992) model has received most support for the first of these predictions (e. g. Pickup 
& Frith, 2001; Langdon et al., 1997), whereas findings relating to the second and third 
predictions are more mixed (e. g. Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995; Greig, Bryson & 
Bell, 2004; Frith & Corcoran, 1996).
2.3 Theory of Mind and Context Processing
In contrast to C. Frith’s (1992) modular account, others have proposed that impaired 
ToM is itself the consequence of more pervasive difficulties in the co-ordination of 
contextually related information in schizophrenia (Phillips & Silverstein, 2003), 
which is clinically manifested in the disorganised symptoms of schizophrenia 
(Uhlhaas et al., 2006). Such theories suggest that ToM is a social-cognitive form of 
context processing. There is some support for an association between impaired ToM 
in schizophrenia and disorganised symptoms (e. g. Sarfati & Hardy-Bayle, 1999; 
Schenkel, Spaulding & Silverstein, 2005) and good evidence to suggest that 
schizophrenia is characterised by context processing deficits of both a perceptual and 
cognitive nature (e. g. Uhlhaas & Silverstein, 2005; Cohen, Barch, Carter & Servan- 
Schreiber, 1999). Contextual processing deficits in schizophrenia have been shown to 
impair performance relative to controls on tasks where context integration is required
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(e. g. Silverstein et al., 2000); and to enhance performance on tasks where context 
information is misleading (e. g. Silverstein, Kovacs, Corry, & Valone, 1996). Such 
examples of enhanced performance discount explanations that impaired task 
performance in schizophrenia is simply due to generalised effects of psychiatric 
illness (Chapman & Chapman, 1978).
A parallel line of inquiry is evident in the autism literature. There is some evidence 
that autism is associated with a context processing deficit, referred to as weak central 
coherence (WCC), characterised by a local information processing bias that leads to 
surrounding context information being ignored (e. g. U. Frith, 1989; Frith & 
Snowling, 1983). U. Frith (1989) argued for the primacy of WCC in autism, stating 
that a ToM deficit could result from a failure to integrate relevant information from a 
variety of sources and that a weak drive for “meaningful” integration of information 
was the “central cognitive dysfunction” associated with autism (p.174). Jarrold, 
Butler, Cottington & Jimenez (2000) demonstrated support for this in an inverse 
relationship found between performance on tasks of ToM and WCC in samples of 
primary-school-aged children with typical development and autism. A similar inverse 
relationship between ToM and WCC has also been reported in adults in the general 
population (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, & Jimenez, 
2000).
Context processing deficits have been shown to be particularly marked in individuals 
with schizophrenia with poor premorbid social functioning (Silverstein et al., 1996), 
and ToM has been linked to overall social functioning in schizophrenia (Roncone, 
Falloon & Mazza, 2002). This suggests that context processing deficits may be
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impacting on ToM in the disorder. To date, few studies have investigated relations 
between ToM and context processing in schizophrenia. Schenkel, Spaulding & 
Silverstein (2005) compared ToM performance on the Hinting Task (Corcoran et al., 
1995) with performance on two perceptual context processing tasks. Impaired ToM 
was associated with impaired context processing on both tasks and these impairments 
were only significantly related to the Psychotic Disorganisation factor of the Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Ventura et al., 1993). Uhlhaas et al (2006) also 
explored relationships between performance on three ToM tasks and a perceptual 
context processing task in schizophrenia. They found significant correlations between 
perceptual context processing and ToM, suggesting that impaired context processing 
was associated with impaired performance on the ToM tasks. From their classification 
of symptoms derived from the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS: Kay, 
Opler & Fiszbein, 1987), Cognitive Disorganisation was also the only symptom group 
consistently correlated with impairments in perceptual context processing as well as 
ToM.
2.4 Schizotypy
Methodologically, research using participants with schizophrenia is subject to 
potentially confounding variables such as medication, poor motivation and small 
sample sizes (Abdi & Sharma, 2005). Langdon & Coltheart (1999) also raised an 
important conceptual confound suggesting that ToM impairments observed in 
schizophrenia could be an artefact of the chronic associality typical of severe and 
enduring mental health problems. To address these issues, clinical research can be 
complemented by testing healthy individuals in the general population. Many studies
67
indicate that psychosis-like symptoms and experiences are apparent in the general 
population, suggesting a continuity model of psychosis (for review, see Myin- 
Germeys, Krabbendam & van Os, 2003). ‘Schizotypy’ is a term that relates to such a 
continuity model. It acknowledges the presence of psychotic-like features in the 
general, non-clinical population, such as belief in telepathy and magic (Claridge & 
Beech, 1995). According to the continuity model, those in the general population high 
in schizotypy resemble individuals with psychosis most closely (Claridge, 1994). 
Although there are similarities that make comparison between clinical and non- 
clinical groups helpful, there are also important limitations that need to be considered. 
For example, there could be differences in the intensity of experiences, how they are 
interpreted and the impact they have upon an individual’s life. Personality is also just 
one feature in the complex combination of genetic and environmental factors that can 
contribute to a clinical presentation.
2.5 Schizotypy and ToM
Three published studies have investigated ToM in schizotypy. They provide some 
evidence that ToM is impaired in individuals high in schizotypy but less clarity 
regarding which analogue symptom profiles of schizotypy are associated with the 
impairment. This may relate to different ways in which symptoms were grouped 
across studies. Langdon & Coltheart’s (1999) two-part study classified participants 
into high and low schizotypes using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; 
Raine, 1991) and compared group performance on their picture-story sequencing task. 
Compared to the control stories, high schizotypes demonstrated more impaired 
sequencing of the ToM stories and longer reaction times to correctly sequence ToM
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stories than low schizotypes. In the first part of their study, impaired ToM was 
associated with the Interpersonal factor of the SPQ. In an extended replication of this 
study to control for executive functioning and ceiling effects, impaired ToM was 
associated with the Cognitive-Perceptual and Disorganised factors of the SPQ. In a 
later study, Langdon & Coltheart (2004) found that impaired ToM (indicated by 
reduced understanding of irony) was also associated with the Cognitive-Perceptual 
factor of the SPQ. Pickup (2006) assessed ToM in schizotypy using Fletcher et al’s 
(1995) story task. Schizotypy was assessed using the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of 
Feelings and Experiences (O-LEFE; Mason, Claridge & Jackson, 1995). Pickup 
(2006) found no differences in ToM when high and low schizotypes were compared. 
However, a regression analysis indicated that high scores on the Unusual Experiences 
factor of the O-LIFE predicted poorer ToM when IQ and executive function were 
controlled for, providing some evidence that experiences analogous to the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia are associated with poor ToM.
2.6 Schizotypy and Context Processing
Several studies have explored perceptual context in schizotypy. There is good 
evidence to suggest that healthy, non-clinical individuals high in schizotypy 
demonstrate more perceptual contextual processing deficits than low schizotypes. 
Using the Navon (1977) letter identification task, high schizotypy has been associated 
with a local information processing advantage, contrary to the global precedence 
effect typically found (Rawlings & Clardige, 1984). The findings regarding which 
analogue symptom profiles are associated with impaired context processing have been 
more varied. For example, the local information processing bias on the Navon (1977)
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task has been associated with the Unusual Experiences and Cognitive Disorganisation 
factors of the O-LIFE (Goodarzi, Wykes & Hemsley, 2000) whereas Tsakanikos & 
Reed (2003) reported that enhanced performance on the Hidden Figures Test 
(Ekstrom, French, Harman & Dermen, 1976), indicative of context processing 
deficits, was associated with the Impulsive Non-Conformity factor of the O-LIFE, and 
that impaired performance was associated with the Introvertive Anhedonia factor. 
Uhlhaas, Silverstein, Phillips & Lovell (2004) found no differences in context 
processing performance on the Contour Integration task (Kovacs, Kozma, Feher & 
Benedek, 1999) or the Visual Size Perception Task (Phillips, Chapman, & Berry, 
2004) when high and low schizotypes were compared. However, high schizotypes 
who were also high in thought disorder, as measured by the Thought Disorder Index 
(Carpenter, Coleman, Watemaux & Perry, 1993), demonstrated more impaired 
context processing than high schizotypes who were low in thought disorder, and low 
schizotypes (who were not assessed for thought disorder). Baron & Kenny (1986) 
noted that inconsistent relations between a predictor and an outcome across studies 
suggests the involvement of a moderator variable. It is possible that thought disorder 
acts as a moderator in the relation between high schizotypy and performance on tasks 
of context processing and ToM.
2.7 Aim of Present Study
To date, no published studies have explored relationships between ToM and context 
processing using the schizotypy paradigm. The current study aims to do this using a 
sample of participants ranging in schizotypy recruited from the general population. 
Symptom profiles analogous to those found in schizophrenia will be measured using
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the O-LIFE. As an additional indicator of disorganisation, thought disorder will be 
assessed using the Thought Disorder Index (Carpenter et al., 1993). ToM will be 
assessed using Langdon & Coltheart’s (1999) Picture-Story sequencing task and the 
‘Eyes Test’ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). Context 
processing will be investigated using the Hidden Figures Test (Ekstrom, French, 
Harman & Dermen, 1976) and the Block Design subset of the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Psychological Corporation, 1999). Non-verbal IQ will 
be controlled for using the Toni-3 (Brown, Sherbenou & Johnsen, 1998) and Verbal 
IQ using the Vocabulary and Similarities subscales of the WASI. Executive 
functioning will be controlled for using the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess 
& Shallice, 1997). High schizotypy, particularly the analogue symptoms associated 
with the Disorganised factor of the OL1FE, and high thought disorder are predicted to 
be associated with impaired ToM task performance but enhanced performance on the 
context processing tasks, reflecting pervasive difficulties in the co-ordination of 
contextually relevant information (Phillips & Silverstein, 2005).
The specific hypotheses are:
1) High schizotypes will have lower position scores on the False Belief stories 
task than low schizotypes, but similar performance on the other story types 
(replicating Langdon & Coltheart (1999)).
2) High schizotypes will take longer to correctly sequence False Belief stories 
than low schizotypes (replicating Langdon & Coltheart (1999)).
3) High schizotypes will perform worse on the Eyes Test than low schizotypes.
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4) Cognitive Disorganisation will predict impaired performance on the False 
Belief stories and the Eyes Test independently of IQ and executive 
functioning.
5) High schizotypes will perform significantly better on the Block Design and 
Hidden Figures Test compared to low schizotypes.
6) Cognitive Disorganisation will predict enhanced performance on the Block 
Design and Hidden Figures Test independently of IQ and executive 
functioning (extended replication of Tsakanikos & Reed (2003).
7) Performance on the ToM and context processing tasks will be inversely 
related.
8) High schizotypes with high thought disorder will have significantly more 
impaired performance on the ToM tasks than low schizotypes with low 
thought disorder.
9) High schizotypes with high thought disorder will have significantly better 
performance on the context processing tasks than low schizotypes with low 
thought disorder (extended replication of Uhlhaas, Silverstein, Phillips & 
Lovell, 2004).
3. Methodology
3.1 Participants
An a-priori power analysis using Zumstat Software (version 2.5) indicated that 80 
participants were required. A medium effect size of 0.15 was used in the calculation 
based on the significant effect of 0.122 reported in Pickup (2006) and Cohen’s (1992)
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formula. The significance level was set to a standard 0.05 level and the power at the 
standard 0.8.
Eighty participants were recruited through associates of the researcher, adverts, and a 
predominantly, although not exclusively, student population from the University 
College London (UCL) subject pool. Inclusion criteria were English as a first 
language, an age between 18 and 70, and no history of psychiatric illness or head 
injury. An on-line version of the Schizotypal Personality Scale (STA) of the Claridge 
and Broks (1984) Schizotypy Questionnaire (STQ) (see Appendix 1) was used as a 
screening measure to ensure that a sample representing a broad range of schizotypy 
was recruited. Participants were categorised as either, ‘high’ ‘medium’ or ‘low’ 
schizotypes based on their STA scores in relation to the population mean. High 
schizotypes scored more than one standard deviation above the mean on the STA, 
medium schizotypes were within one standard deviation of the mean, and low 
schizotypes scored greater than one standard deviation below the mean. In total, 34 
males and 46 females participated in the study. Their ages ranged between 18 and 67 
years (mean (SD) = 27.49 (10.73)). Ten participants fell within the ‘low’ range on the 
STA (6 males, 4 females; mean (SD) age = 30.4 (12.8)). Thirty-five participants fell 
within the ‘average’ range on the STA (13 males, 22 females; mean (SD) age = 26.4 
(9.66)). Thirty-five participants fell within the ‘high’ range (15 males, 20 females; 
mean (SD) age = 27.74 (11.27)).
The Lie Scale of the Short Form of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised 
(EPQ-R; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991) was incorporated into the STA. The measure 
consists of 12 questions which assess the tendency to give false, socially desirable
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responses. At the screening stage, 4 participants scored more than 2 SDs above the 
population mean on the Lie Scale and were not recruited to take part in the rest of the 
study. The other responses on the Lie Scale were low, ranging between 0-2.
3.2 Materials
Following the screening procedure outlined above, all participants completed the 
following measures:
3.2.1 Dimensional Assessment of Schizotypy: The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of 
Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason, Claridge & Jackson, 1995)
The O-LIFE (see Appendix 2) is a self-report measure consisting of 104 questions 
that measure four scales: Unusual Experiences, Cognitive Disorganisation, 
Introvertive Anhedonia and Impulsive Non-Conformity. The four scales are 
analogous to the symptom dimensions of schizophrenia (e.g. Mason & Claridge, 
2006). The Unusual Experiences (UE) subscale contains perceptual, hallucinatory and 
magical thinking items and can be considered a non-clinical analogue of the positive 
symptoms of psychosis. The Cognitive Disorganisation (CD) sub-scale relates to 
difficulties with attention, concentration, decision-making and social anxiety. The 
Introvertive Anhedonia (LA) sub-scale describes difficulties with enjoyment, 
avoidance and intimacy and can be considered a non-clinical analogue of the negative 
symptoms of psychosis. Impulsive Non-Conformity (IN) contains items that describe 
impulsive, anti-social and eccentric forms of behaviour. Scores on the O-LIFE have 
been shown to vary according to sex and age (Mason & Claridge, 2006). To account
74
for this, raw scores were standardised using the Mason & Claridge (2006) population 
norms. Test-retest reliability is reported to be high across all four sub-scales of the O- 
LIFE, being greater than 0.7 (Burch, Steel & Hemsley, 1988). High internal 
consistency has also been reported for Unusual Experiences (a = 0.89); Cognitive 
Disorganisation (a = 0.87); Introvertive Anhedonia (a = 0.82) and Impulsive 
Nonconformity (a = 0.77). The construct validity of the O-LIEE has been established 
through its use in a variety of studies across different research domains (see Mason & 
Claridge, 2006 for review).
3.2.2 Theory of Mind Tasks
Two measures of ToM were used.
3.2.2.1 The Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001)
In this test of ToM (see Appendix 3 for example), participants were presented with 36 
photographs of the eye-region of faces. Each photograph is surrounded by four words. 
Participants were asked to choose which word best describes the mental state of the 
person in the picture. If they were unsure of a term, participants were able to consult a 
glossary of terms. The total score consists of the number of correct responses, ranging 
from 0 to 36. No reliability data for this measure are reported. It has however been 
used to distinguish high functioning adults with autism from controls (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001).
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3.2.2.2 Picture-Story Sequencing Task (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999)
Participants were presented with four pictures in a pre-determined order and were 
asked to arrange them into a story that shows a logical sequence (see Appendix 4 for 
examples). There were four story types: False Belief, Social Script, Mechanical and 
Capture. Accurate sequencing of the False Belief stories required appreciation of a 
story character’s false belief, so these stories assessed ToM. The Social Script stories 
depicted people acting out everyday social scenarios (such as doing the shopping), 
which did not require inferring beliefs or intentions. The Mechanical stories (such as a 
boulder rolling down a hill) controlled for physical cause-and-effect reasoning. The 
Capture stories portrayed people in everyday situations where a highly salient, 
misleading cue had to be inhibited if participants were to take account of other less 
salient story details necessary to correctly sequence the story. In this respect, the 
capture stories controlled for inhibitory suppression. The Capture stories were also 
designed to be more difficult than the False Belief stories, so as to control for possible 
ceiling effects with performance on the False Belief stories.
The task was administered and scored according to the instructions outlined in 
Langdon & Coltheart (1999). Each set of stories received a score ranging between 0 
and 6. Two points were awarded if the first or last card was in the right position. One 
point was awarded if the second or third card was in the right position. Responses 
were timed.
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3.2.3 Context Processing Tasks
Two context processing tasks were chosen in which contextual processing deficits 
were expected to result in enhanced performance as contextual information in these 
tasks is misleading.
3.2.3.1 The Hidden Figures Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman & Dermen, 1976)
In this task (see Appendix 5 for example), participants were presented with five 
simple figures that were available throughout the task, and thirty-two complex figure 
problems. The aim of the task was to identify which one of the five simple figures 
was hidden in each of the complex figures. Participants were given a maximum time 
of 24 minutes to complete the task. Contextual information in the complex figures is 
distracting, so it was anticipated that contextual processing deficits would lead to 
enhanced performance. The total score consists of the number of correct responses, 
ranging from 0 to 32. No psychometric data are reported for this measure.
3.2.3.2 Block Design Sub-Scale of the WASI (Psychological Corporation, 1999)
In this task, participants were presented with target figures comprising red and white 
segments. They were required to recreate the target figure using blocks made up of 
red and white segments. The raw score is a function of accuracy and reaction time, 
ranging between 0 and 71. Raw scores were converted into standardised T scores. The 
WASI manual (Psychological Corporation, 1999) reported good split test reliability 
(ranging from 0.9 and 0.94); test-retest reliability (0.92) and good inter-rater
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reliability (in the high 0.90s). In terms of validity, the WASI manual reported good 
convergent validity (0.83) between the Block Design sub-scale of the WASI and the 
WAIS III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997).
3.2.4 Thought Disorder Index (TDI): Short Form (Carpenter et al., 1993)
The full version of the TDI was developed by Johnston & Holzman (1979) as a way 
of classifying and measuring instances of disordered thinking. The short form of the 
TDI derives estimates of thought disorder with four Rorschach cards that are 
comparable to the full 10-card version. The four Rorschach cards used were, II, IV, 
VI and IX from the full version of the index. These were chosen because they had the 
strongest associations with the ‘Peculiar Verbalisations and Responses’ category of 
the 10-card version (Carpenter et al., 1993), and such responses have been shown to 
be the most common thought disordered responses in non-clinical populations 
(Coleman, Levy, Lenzenweger & Holzman, 1996).The short form of the TDI was 
administered according to the instructions outlined by Rapport, Gill & Shafer (1968), 
consisting of a response and inquiry stage.
Participants were presented with each Rorschach card and responses to the question 
“what might this be’’ were audio-recorded. If participants did not respond, a series of 
increasingly concrete questions were asked, such as “What does it look like to you?” 
and “Is there anything on this card which reminds you of anything?” After each 
response, participants were prompted to check if they had any other ideas before the 
card was turned over. When the card was turned over, the inquiry stage was 
conducted, in which an explanation of participants’ responses was elicited. This was
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done in accordance with the recommendations made by Solovay et al. (1986) in 
which a naive stance was adopted by the examiner to clarify responses without 
leading the participant.
Once responses had been audio-recorded, they were transcribed verbatim. The 
transcriptions were then coded according to the scoring manual for the TDI (Solovay 
et al., 1986). This distinguishes 23 qualitative categories of thought disturbance 
associated with four levels of severity: 0.25 level, 0.50, 0.75 and 1.00, with 0.25 
representing the mildest forms and 1.00 the severest forms of thought disorder. Once 
incidents of thought disorder had been classified and rated, a TDI index score was 
calculated, based on the sum of severity scores divided by the total number of 
Rorschach responses.
Johnston & Holzman (1979) reported good inter-rater reliability for the full 10 card 
version of the TDI (r = 0.82 to 0.93). The full 10 card version has also demonstrated 
good predictive validity in predicting psychotic symptoms in patients with borderline 
and schizotypal personality disorders (O’Connell, Cooper, Perry & Hoke, 1989) and 
has also been used to measure neuroleptic induced reductions of thought disorder in 
individuals with schizophrenia (Hurt, Holzman & Davies, 1983).
In order to determine reliability, 40 transcripts (from those with even participant 
numbers) were second-rated. It was not straightforward counting the total number of 
Rorschach responses, as where one response ended and another began involved a 
degree of subjectivity. In this respect, the interclass correlation for the total number of 
Rorschach responses was calculated (0.81). The percentage co-occurrence of the
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categorical variables was calculated as 79% (see part 3, critical review for more 
discussion on this).
3.2.5 Control Tasks
Three control tasks were administered to account for the possibly confounding 
influences of executive functioning, non-verbal IQ and verbal IQ.
3.2.5.1 The Brixton Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997)
In this non-verbal test of executive functioning, participants were presented with a 
booklet of 54 cards each with a pattern of nine open circles and one blue circle. The 
location of the blue circle changes on each succeeding card according to patterns that 
can change without warning. Participants were instructed to indicate where s/he 
thought the blue circle would be on the next card. The raw score is based on the 
number of errors made. Raw scores ranging from 0 to 54 were converted to a scaled 
score of 1 to 10, with 10 indicating 0-7 errors and being classified as “very superior”, 
and 1 indicating over 31 errors and being classified as “impaired”. Burgess & Shallice 
(1997) reported high test-retest reliability (r=0.71) as well as good split-test reliability 
(r=0.62) on this test.
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3.2.5.2 Test of Non-Verbal Intelligence, 3rd Edition (TONI-3: Brown, Sherbenou & 
Johnsen, 1998)
This test was used to control for non-verbal IQ. Participants were asked to solve 50 
problems by identifying relationships among abstract figures and discovering the rule 
that governed that relationship. Each item presented a set of figures with one part 
missing. Participants were given a set of response alternatives from which s/he had to 
select the correct part to complete the pattern. The TONI-3 is distinguished from the 
context processing tasks as it primarily involves logical rather than perceptual 
processes. The raw score is based on the total number of correct items, ranging from 
0 to 50, which were transformed into deviation quotients, with a mean of 100 and 
standard deviation of 15. Brown et al. (1998) reported good split-half reliability for 
different age groups (all equal or exceeding 0.89); good test-retest reliability (0.9) and 
inter-rater reliability (0.96). In terms of validity, Brown et al. (1998) reported 
correlations between the TONI-3 and the Verbal Scale IQ (0.51), Performance Scale 
IQ (0.76) and Full Scale IQ (0.71) of the WAIS-R (Psychological Corporation, 1981).
3.2.5.3 Vocabulary and Similarities Sub-Scales of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence (WASI: Psychological Corporation, 1999))
In order to control for verbal IQ when assessing thought disorder, the Vocabulary and 
Similarities sub-scales of the WASI were administered. In Vocabulary, participants 
were asked to explain the meaning of a list of 42 increasingly difficult words. In 
Similarities, participants were asked to identify the increasingly complex relationship 
between 26 pairs of words. For both sub-scales, responses were awarded a score of 0,
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1, 2 or 3 based on the scoring criteria in the manual. Raw scores were the total 
number of correct responses, ranging from 0 to 80 for Vocabulary and 0 to 48 for 
Similarities. Raw scores for the Vocabulary and Similarities sub-scales were 
converted into a verbal IQ score, with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. 
The WASI manual (Psychological Corporation, 1999) reported good split test 
reliability (ranging from 0.9 to 0.98 for Vocabulary and 0.84 to 0.96 for Similarities); 
good test-retest reliability (0.87 for Vocabulary and 0.85 for Similarities) and good 
inter-rater reliability (0.98 for Vocabulary and 0.99 for Similarities). In terms of 
validity, the WASI manual also reported good convergent validity with the 
Vocabulary and Similarities sub-scales of the WAIS III (0.72 and 0.69 respectively).
3.3 Procedure
Participants were given written information about the study (see Appendix 6) and 
were given the opportunity to ask questions. After giving written, informed consent to 
take part (see Appendix 6), participants were individually administered the 10 tasks in 
the order below in a quiet room:
1) O-LIFE; 2) Eyes Test; 3) Hidden Figures Test; 4) Brixton 5) TONI-3;
6) Vocabulary; 7) Block Design; 8) Similarities; 9) Picture-Story Sequencing Task;
10) TDI
For each participant, the tasks took an average of 2 hours to complete. Participants 
were paid £12 for taking part.
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3.4 Ethics
The study was approved by the University College London Research Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix 7)
4. Results
4.1 Schizotypy Scales
Table 1 describes the means and standard deviations (SD) from the normative 
samples for the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 2006) and STA (Joseph & Peters, 1995) and 
the means, standard deviations and range of scores from the current study.
Table 1:
Normative sample mean (SD), current study mean (SD) and range of questionnaire 
scores for the whole sample (N=80)
Scale Normative Sample Current Study Current
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Study Range
STA 10.45 (3.6) 14.33 (7.03) 1-28
O-LIFE Total Score 22.62 (20.64) 35.67 (13.07) 10-67
O-LIFE Unusual Experiences (UE) 8.82 (6.16) 9.33 (7.22) 0-26
O-LIFE Cognitive Disorganisation (CD) 10.73 (5.87) 12.35(5.71) 0-24
O-LIFE Introvertive Anhedonia (LA) 6.38 (4.49) 5.49 (4.57) 0-23
O-LIFE Impulsive Non-Conformity (IN) 7.69 (4.12) 8.44 (3.28) 0-15
Two scores on the LA sub-scale were considered outliers and excluded from further 
analysis as they were more than three standard deviations above the mean (z = 3.83 
and 3.39).
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Raw scores on the O-LIFE were converted to standard scores for analysis using 
Mason et al.’s (2006) sex and age norms (standard score = raw score -  norm mean 
score/ SD). The total O-LIFE standard score was then the sum of the standard scores 
for each sub-scale. The standardised IA and UE scores were then corrected for a 
severe positive skew through the application of logio transformations
4.2 IQ and Executive Functioning Test Scores
Table 2 describes the means, standard deviations (SD) and range of scores for the 
tests of Non-Verbal IQ, Verbal IQ and executive functioning.
Table 2:
Mean (SD) and range scores on tests of IQ and executive functioning
Test Mean (SD) Range
Non-Verbal IQ (TONI-3) 102.96 (10.55) 83-130
Verbal IQ (WASI) 113.76(11.19) 86-142
Executive Functioning (Brixton) 7.25(1.7) 4-10
The scores for the above tests were normally distributed and contained no outliers. 
Correlations revealed no significant associations between the O-LIFE total standard 
score and executive functioning (r = -0.054; p = 0.316) or verbal IQ (r = 0.27; p = 
0.410). However, O-LIFE total standard score was significantly correlated with Non- 
Verbal IQ (r = -0.191; p = 0.045), indicating that high scores on the O-LIFE were 
associated with poorer non-verbal IQ.
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4.3 Theory of Mind Tasks
Two position scores for the False Belief stories were considered outliers and removed, 
both with Z scores of -3.34. False Belief position scores were then corrected for a 
severe negative skew through the application of a logio transformation after scores 
had been reflected.
One score on the Eyes Test was considered an outlier and removed (Z = -3.74).
Scores on the Eyes test were then corrected for a moderate negative skew through the 
application of a square root transformation after scores had been reflected.
4.3.1 Correlations between ToM Tasks
In order to assess if the Eyes Test and the False Belief stories in the Langdon & 
Coltheart (1999) task were assessing the same construct, transformed scores for the 
False Belief stories were correlated with the transformed scores for the Eyes Test (N= 
77). There was no significant association (r = 0.03; p = 0.81), indicating that they do 
not have a significant amount of shared variance and are likely to measure different 
aspects of ToM. An aggregate measure of ToM was thus not calculated.
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4.4 Hypothesis 1: High schizotypes will have a lower position score on the False 
Belief stories task than low schizotypes, but similar performance on the other 
story types
Two position scores for the Social Script and Physical stories were considered outliers 
and removed (Z = -3.68 and -3.7 respectively). There were no outliers for the Capture 
scores, and those for the False Belief scores are described above. Scores for the Social 
Script and Physical stories were then corrected for a severe negative skew through the 
application of logio transformation after scores had been reflected.
Participants were divided into two groups, ‘high schizotypes’ and ‘low schizotypes’, 
based on the median split of the O-LIFE total standard score (median = -0.4251). 
Table 3 summarises the mean untransformed position scores for each of the four story 
types for high and low schizotypes.
Table 3:
Mean (SD) position scores for each of the four story types
Story Type Low Schizotypes 
Mean (SD)
High Schizotypes 
Mean (SD)
Social Script 5.78 (0.41) 5.63 (0.51)
Mechanical 5.54 (0.59) 5.43 (0.77)
Capture 4.15(0.1) 4.3 (1.1)
False Belief 5.19(0.64) 5.18(0.81)
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with position scores for the Capture 
stories and transformed scores for the other three stories as the dependent variables, 
and the median split of the O-LIFE total standard score as the grouping factor. 
Contrary to Langdon & Coltheart (1999), there was no significant effect of schizotypy
86
(F (1, 73) = 0.73; p = 0.4). There was a significant effect of story type (F (3, 73) = 
1004.42; p = <0.001). This was not investigated further as the effect of story type 
across participants as a whole was not considered relevant to the study hypotheses. 
The interaction between schizotypy and story type was not significant (F (3, 73) = 
0.28; p = 0.84).
4.5 Hypothesis 2: High schizotypes will take longer to correctly sequence False 
Belief stories than low schizotypes
Table 4 shows the mean reaction times to correctly sequence each of the four story 
types.
Table 4:
Reaction time (sec) to correctly sequence stories
Story Type Low Schizotypes High Schizotypes
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Social Script 13.35 (3.3) 13.14(3.64)
Mechanical 15.76 (5.68) 15.61 (5.42)
Capture 29.29 (14.0) 28.17(11.0)
False-Belief 20.74 (8.41) 18.81 (6.29)
One False Belief reaction time (z = 3.82), one Mechanical reaction time (z = 6.85) 
and two Social Script reaction times (both z = 3.19) were considered outliers and 
removed from the analysis. One participant did not correctly sequence any False 
Belief stories and five participants did not correctly sequence any Capture stories and 
were thus not included in the analysis. Reaction time data for all four story types were 
characterised by a severe positive skew and were corrected through the application of 
Log io transformations.
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A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with transformed reaction times for the 
four story types as the dependent variables, and the median split of the O-LIFE total 
standard score as the grouping factor (N = 74). There was no significant effect of 
schizotypy (F (1, 67) = 0.15; p = 0.7). There was a significant effect of story type (F 
(3, 67) = 115.8; p = <0.001). As before, this was not investigated further as reaction 
times to the stories overall were not relevant to the study hypotheses. There was no 
significant interaction between schizotypy and reaction times (F (3, 67) = 0.34; p = 
0 .8).
4.6 Hypothesis 3: High schizotypes will perform worse on the Eyes Test than low 
schizotypes
Table 5 shows scores on the Eyes Test for high and low schizotypes.
Table 5:
Eyes test performance
Low Schizotypes High Schizotypes
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
28.13 (3.28) 27.68 (3.04)
An independent samples t test (N = 79) showed that there was no significant 
difference between the two groups (t (75) = -0.76; p = 0.45).
4.7 Hypothesis 4: Cognitive Disorganisation will predict impaired performance 
on the False Belief stories and the Eyes Test independently of IQ and executive 
functioning
Two separate multiple regression analyses were performed in three successive steps 
with transformed False Belief position scores (N = 78) and transformed Eyes Test 
scores (N = 79) as the dependent variables. At the first and second steps, non-verbal 
IQ and executive functioning respectively were entered into the regression equations 
as predictor variables. At the third step, standardised scores for the CD and IN scales 
and transformed standard scores for the UE and LA scales of the O-LIFE were entered 
into the regression equation as predictor variables. For each analysis the assumptions 
of linearity, homoscedasticity, independent errors and normally distributed errors 
necessary for regression (Berry, 1993) were met.
4.7.1 False Belief Stories
The overall equation for the first step (F (1, 74) = 4.5; p = 0.037) accounted for 5.7% 
of the total variance. The overall equation for the second step (F (2, 73) = 2.6, p = 
0.081), accounted for 6.7% of the total variance. The overall equation for the third 
step (F (6, 75) = 2.1, p = 0.064), accounted for 15.5% of the total variance. Table 6 
presents the regression coefficients for the predictor variables. Scores for the UE and 
CD sub-scales were negatively associated with ToM performance, but not 
significantly so. Contrary to the predictions of the study, Introvertive Anhedonia and 
Impulsive Non-Conformity were positively associated with ToM performance. This 
association was approaching significance for the IA sub-scale, indicating that as IA
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scores increased by one standard deviation (0.146), False Belief performance 
increased by 0.248 standard deviations.
Table 6:
Non-verbal IQ, executive functioning and O-LIFE standard sub-scale scores as 
predictors of position scores on the False Belief Stories Task
Predictor Variable B SEB Beta t P
Non-Verbal IQ 0.004 0.002 0.239 3.315 0.01
Executive Functioning 0.01 0.012 0.101 0.853 0.396
O-LIFE UE -0.085 0.117 - 0.099 -0.724 0.472
O-LIFE CD -0.039 0.024 -0.239 -1.606 0.113
O-LIFE IA 0.286 0.147 0.248 1.945 0.056
O-LIFE IN 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.005 0.996
4.7.2 Eyes Test
The overall equations for the first step (F (1, 75) = 0.7, p = 0.41); second step (F (2,
74) = 0.35, p = 0.7) and third step (F (6, 70) = 0.58, p = 0.75) were not significant. 
Table 7 shows the regression coefficients for the predictor variables.
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Table 7:
Non-verbal IQ, executive functioning and O-LIFE standard sub-scale scores as 
predictors of the number of correct responses on the Eyes Test
Predictor Variable B SEB Beta t P
Non-Verbal IQ 0.006 0.007 0.096 0.834 0.407
Executive Functioning -0.006 0.045 -0.17 -0.141 0.888
O-LIFE UE -0.509 0.442 -0.166 1.152 0.253
O-LIFE CD 0.053 0.095 0.086 0.556 0.580
O-LIFE IA -0.682 0.556 -0.164 1.226 0.224
O-LIFE IN 0.037 0.092 0.051 0.398 0.692
4.8 Context Processing Tasks
Block Design scores were transformed to correct for a moderate negative skew 
through the application of a square root transformation after scores had been reflected. 
Scores on the Hidden Figures Test were normally distributed.
4.8.1 Correlations between Context Processing Tasks
Transformed Block Design scores and Hidden Figures Test scores were significantly 
correlated (r = 0.63; p = <0.001). This correlation remained significant when non­
verbal IQ and executive functioning were co-varied (r = 0.56; p = 0.01), indicating 
that there was a significant amount of shared variance. A composite context 
processing task score was calculated based on Z scores.
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4.9 Hypothesis 5: High schizotypes will perform significantly better on Block 
Design and the Hidden Figures Test compared to low schizotypes
4.9.1 Block Design
Table 8 shows Block Design scores for high and low schizotypes.
Table 8:
Block Design test performance
Low Schizotypes High Schizotypes
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
57.67 (6.27) 57.5 (8.94)
An independent samples t test showed that there was no significant difference 
between the two groups (t (75) = 0.37; p = 0.34).
4.9.2 Hidden Figures Test
Table 9 shows Hidden Figures scores for high and low schizotypes.
Table 9:
Hidden Figures test performance
Low Schizotypes High Schizotypes
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
14.58 (7.93) 14.51 (8.74)
An independent samples t test with scores on the Hidden Figures Test as the 
dependent variable and high versus low schizotypy as the grouping variable showed
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that there were no significant differences between the two groups (t (76) = 0.041; p = 
0.484)).
4.9.3 Composite Context Processing Task Score
Table 10 shows the composite context processing task scores for high and low 
schizotypes.
Table 10:
Composite context processing task scores
Low Schizotypes High Schizotypes
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
-0.0001 (0.79) -0.0227 (1.022)
An independent-samples t test with composite context processing score as the 
dependent variable and high versus low schizotypy as the grouping variable showed 
that there were no significant differences between the two groups (t (75) = 0.109; p = 
0.457).
4.10 Hypothesis 6: Cognitive Disorganisation will predict enhanced performance 
on the Block Design and Hidden Figures Test independently of IQ and executive 
functioning.
Two multiple regression analyses identical to that described above for hypothesis 4 
were conducted with transformed Block Design scaled scores and Hidden Figures 
Test scores as the dependent variables. A third analysis was also conducted with the 
composite context processing task score as the dependent variable. For each analysis
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the assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity, independent errors and normally 
distributed errors necessary for regression (Berry, 1993) were met.
4.10.1 Block Design
The overall equations for the first step (F (1, 75) = 11.9, p = 0.001), second step (F (2, 
74) = 7.16, p = 0.001) and third step (F (6, 70) = 2.72, p = 0.02) were all significant, 
accounting for 13.7%, 16.2% and 18.9% of the total variance respectively. Table 11 
presents the regression coefficients for the predictor variables. Contrary to 
expectations, Cognitive Disorganisation was negatively associated with Block Design 
performance, although only non-verbal IQ made a significant independent 
contribution to Block Design score.
Table 11:
Non-verbal IQ, executive functioning and O-LIFE standard sub-scale scores as 
predictors of Block Design performance
Predictor Variable B SEB Beta t P
Non-Verbal IQ 0.04 0.01 0.37 3.45 0.001
Executive Functioning 0.11 0.07 0.17 1.5 0.14
O-LIFE UE 0.3 0.73 0.05 0.41 0.68
O-LIFE CD -0.22 0.16 -0.2 -1.41 0.16
O-LIFE IA 1.07 0.92 0.14 1.16 0.25
O-LIFE IN 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.4 0.7
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4.10.2 Hidden Figures Test
The overall equations for the first (F (1, 76) = 14.74, p = <0.001), second (F (2, 75) = 
8.75, p = <0.001) and third steps (F (6, 71) = 3.48, p = 0.004) were significant, 
accounting for 15%, 16% and 18% of the total variance respectively. Table 12 shows 
the regression coefficients for the predictor variables. Contrary to the predictions of 
the study, the regression slopes for the Cognitive Disorganisation and Impulsive 
Nonconformity sub-scales were negative, indicating that an average increase in each 
of them was associated with a decrease in Hidden Figures Test performance. The 
regression slopes for the Unusual Experiences and Intorvertive Anhedonia subscales 
were positive. However, only non-verbal IQ made a significant independent 
contribution to Hidden Figures Test performance.
Table 12:
Non-verbal IQ, executive functioning and O-LIFE standard sub-scale scores as 
predictors of the number of correct responses on the Hidden Figures Test
Predictor Variable B SEB Beta t P
Non-Verbal IQ 0.31 0.08 0.4 3.83 <0.001
Executive Functioning 0.79 0.54 0.16 1.48 0.14
O-LIFE UE 0.362 0.89 0.1 0.41 0.69
O-LIFE CD -1.5 1.13 -0.184 -1.33 0.188
O-LIFE IA 5.36 3.76 0.17 1.43 0.16
O-LIFE IN -0.87 1.12 -0.09 -0.77 0.44
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4.10.3 Composite Context Processing Tasks Scores
The overall equations for the first step (F (1, 75) = 16.9, p = <0.001), second step (F 
(2, 74) = 10.12, p = <0.001) and third step (F (6, 70) = 4.12, p = 0.01) were all 
significant, accounting for 18.4%, 21.5% and 26.1% of the total variance respectively. 
Table 13 shows the regression coefficients for the predictor variables. Contrary to 
expectations, Cognitive Disorganisation was negatively associated with the composite 
score on the context processing tasks, although as before, only non-verbal IQ made a 
significant independent contribution to the composite context processing task score.
Table 13:
Non-verbal IQ, executive functioning and O-LIFE standard sub-scale scores as 
predictor variables for scores on the composite context processing task
Predictor Variable B SEB Beta t P
Non-Verbal IQ 0.04 0.01 0.43 4.11 <0.001
Executive Functioning 0.01 0.06 0.19 1.7 0.09
O-LIFE UE 0.33 0.57 0.72 0.58 0.57
O-LIFE CD -0.21 0.12 -0.23 -1.69 0.1
O-LIFE IA 1.09 0.72 0.18 1.51 0.14
O-LIFE IN -0.06 0.12 -0.6 -0.54 0.5
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4.11 Hypothesis 7: Performance on the ToM and context processing tasks will be 
inversely related.
As described in table 14, correlations were performed between task performance on 
the context processing and ToM tasks covarying for non-verbal IQ and executive 
functioning. None of the associations were significant.
Table 14:
Correlations between context processing & ToM tasks co-varying for non-verbal IQ 
and executive functioning
Hidden
Figures
Block
Design
Composite
Context
Processing
Score
Eyes Test r = 0.03 
p = 0.4
r = 0.08 
p = 0.24
r = 0.02 
P = 0.43
False Belief Story Task r = 0.05 r = -0.001 r = 0.01
Position Score p = 0.32 p = 0.5 p = 0.45
4.12 Thought Disorder
75 participants were assessed for thought disorder. Table 15 shows the total 
frequencies of categories identified with their corresponding degree of severity. The 
mean thought disorder index (TDI) score was 0.08 (SD = 0.08). The minimum value 
was 0, and the maximum was 0.36.
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Table 15:
Categories & frequencies of thought disorder found
Category (severity level) Frequency
Peculiar Verbalisations & 85
Responses (0.25) 
Inappropriate Distance (0.25) 80
Vagueness (0.25) 11
Incongruous Combinations (0.25) 8
Flippant Response (0.25) 2
Tendency to Looseness (0.25) 3
Tendency to Confusion (0.25) 3
Confusion (0.5) 3
Fragmentation (0.5) 2
Two TDI scores were considered outliers and removed (Z = 3.18 and 3.26). TDI 
scores were then corrected for a reverse J distribution by dividing one by each score. 
After this transformation the TDI scores were still considered too skewed (z = 3), so 
non-parametric methods were used when TDI scores were the dependent variable.
The median split of the TDI scores (0.24) was used to create high and low TDI 
groups. Table 16 shows mean scores and standard deviations for the two groups in 
relation to verbal IQ, non-verbal IQ, executive functioning, total O-LIFE standard 
score and Cognitive Disorganisation scores on the O- LIFE. Two-tailed independent- 
samples t tests with high versus low TDI as the grouping factor (N = 73) showed that 
this difference was not significant for verbal IQ (t (74) = 0.172; p = 0.63); non-verbal 
IQ (t (78) = -0.12; p = 0.91); total O-LIFE standard score (t (76) = 0.43; p = 0.67) or 
Cognitive Disorganisation (t (78) = 1.39; p = 0.17). The low TDI group had lower 
executive functioning scores than the high TDI group, and this difference approached 
significance (t (78) = -1.81; p = 0.074). Executive functioning could relate to the TDI 
score as the latter is calculated by dividing the number of incidents of thought
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disorder by the total number of ideas generated. This is unlikely to effect 
interpretation of the current findings as better executive functioning was associated 
with higher levels of thought disorder.
Table 16:
High and Low TDI groups in relation to verbal IQ, on-verbal IQ, executive 
functioning, total O-LIFE standard score and Cognitive Disorganisation standard 
Score
Domain High TDI Low TDI
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
N  = 37 N  = 38
TDI 0.15(0.07) 0.021 (0.02)
Verbal IQ 113.18(10.12) 114.42(12.38)
Non-Verbal IQ 103.1 (11.0) 102.82(10.17)
Executive Functioning 7.57(1.7) 6.89(1.64)
Total O-LIFE Standard Score -0.33 (2.87) -0.06 (2.59)
Cognitive Disorganisation Standard Score 0.01 (1.09) 0.32 (0.91)
4.13 Hypothesis 8: High schizotypes with high thought disorder will have 
significantly more impaired performance on the ToM tasks than low schizotypes 
with low thought disorder.
Participants were allocated to one of four groups described in table 17 based on the 
median split of their total O-LIFE score and the median split of the TDI scores (0.24). 
A Kruskal-Wallis test with TDI scores as the dependent variable (N = 75) showed that 
there was a significant difference between the four groups (%2 (3) = 56.26; p = 
<0.001). The comparison of most interest to assess was between the low schizotypy 
group low in thought disorder and the high schizotypy group high in thought disorder. 
A Mann-Whitney U test showed that this difference was significant (z = -5.01; p = 
0 .001).
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Table 17:
TDI scores for the four schizotypy-thought disorder groups
Group N TDI
Mean (SD)
Low schizotypy-low thought disorder 18 0.18(0.18)
Low schizotypy-high thought disorder 20 0.15(0.08)
High schizotypy-low thought disorder 20 0.02 (0.22)
High schizotypy-high thought disorder 17 0.14 (0.07)
Table 18 shows the scores on the ToM tasks for each of the four groups.
Table 18:
Eyes Test performance and False Belief Story position score by schizotypy-thought
disorder group
Group N False Belief Eyes Test Score
Stories Mean Mean (SD)
(SD)
Low schizotypy-low thought disorder 18 5.07 (0.71) 27.89 (2.87)
Low schizotypy-high thought disorder 20 5.21 (0.63) 28.2 (3.47)
High schizotypy-low thought disorder 20 5.32 (0.89) 27.32 (3.18)
High schizotypy-high thought disorder 17 5.16(0.63) 27.94 (3.1)
An ANOVA with transformed scores on the ToM tasks as the dependent variable and 
schizotypy-thought disorder as the grouping variable showed that there were no 
significant differences in False Belief position scores (N = 75) (F (3,69) = 0.68, p = 
0.57) or the Eyes Test (N = 75) (F (3,70) = 0.34, p = 0.8).
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4.14 Hypothesis 9: High schizotypes with high thought disorder will have 
significantly better performance on the context processing tasks than low 
schizotypes with low thought disorder
Table 19 shows the Block Design, Hidden Figures Test and composite context 
processing task scores for each of the four schizotypy-thought disorder groups.
Table 19:
Context processing task performance by schizotypy-thought disorder group
Group N Block Design 
Mean (SD)
Hidden 
Figures Test 
Mean (SD)
Composite 
Context 
Processing 
Task Score 
Mean (SD)
Low schizotypy-low thought disorder 18 56.83 (5.83) 14.1 (7.2) -0.08 (0.68)
Low schizotypy-high thought disorder 20 59.6 (5.92) 16.15(9.07) 0.22 (0.87)
High schizotypy-low thought disorder 20 57.53 (10.07) 16.0 (10.04) 0.07(1.24)
High schizotypy-high thought disorder 17 57.82 (7.9) 12.0 (6.83) -0.15(0.78)
An ANOVA with transformed scaled Block Design scores as the dependent variable 
showed there were no significant differences between the four schizotypy-thought 
disorder groups (F(3,70) = 4.83, p = 0.7). Similarly, there were no significant group 
differences when Hidden Figures Test scores (F (3, 71) = 0.96, p = 0.42) and the 
composite context processing task scores (F (3, 70) = 0.6, p = 0.62) were the 
dependent variables.
5. Discussion
Individuals with schizophrenia and non-clinical individuals high in schizotypy have 
been shown to have impaired ToM and impaired context processing. The current
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study explored links between these two deficits using the schizotypy paradigm in light 
of research suggesting that impaired ToM is best understood as a consequence of 
pervasive difficulties in the co-ordination of contextually relevant information 
(Phillips & Silverstein, 2003). Based on the existing literature, nine hypotheses were 
generated that aimed to replicate and extend previous findings using a range of 
established measures. The non-significant findings of this study are discussed below 
in relation to three main areas: i) overall ToM and context processing performance, ii) 
analogue symptom profiles and iii) thought disorder.
5.1 Overall ToM and Context Processing Performance
5.1.1 ToM
Two measurements of ToM were used: a False Belief Picture-Story sequencing task 
(Langdon & Coltheart, 1999) and the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It was 
predicted that high total schizotypy scores, as measured by the O-LIFE, would be 
associated with impaired ToM. Contrary to expectations, high total schizotypes were 
not significantly more impaired at sequencing the False Belief stories than low 
schizotypes as reported by Langdon & Coltheart (1999).
The present study was the first to investigate performance on Langdon & Coltheart’s 
(1999) story task using the O-LIFE. Langdon & Coltheart (1999) divided participants 
into high and low schizotypy groups using the median split of the Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991), which might be cited as one reason 
for the differences observed between the two studies. Pickup (2006) also failed to find
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a significant difference between high and low schizotypes on ToM performance using 
Fletcher et al.’s (1995) story task when the median split of the O-LIFE was used. 
Pickup (2006) noted that the SPQ is more similar to the Unusual Experiences (UE) 
sub-scale of the O-LIFE than the O-LIFE as a whole, which explained why a 
regression analysis indicated that high scores on the UE sub-scale predicted poorer 
ToM when verbal IQ and executive functioning were controlled for. The current study 
found that scores on the UE sub-scale were inversely associated with position scores 
for the False Belief stories, but they were not a significant predictor of performance. It 
is unlikely that this reflects a restricted range of scores on the UE sub-scale because a 
good range of scores was achieved in the present study, and the means and standard 
deviations were similar to those achieved in the normative sample (Mason et al., 
2006). Equally, insufficient statistical power is not a possible explanation, as Langdon 
& Coltheart (1999) found significant results with sample sizes of 40 and 28 in the first 
and second parts of their study respectively.
The only significant predictor of performance on the False Belief stories in the current 
study was non-verbal IQ. There were no significant differences between high and low 
schizotypes on the ‘Capture’ stories (which were more difficult than the False Belief 
stories) in the current study or in Langdon & Coltheart’s (1999) study. The inclusion 
of these stories was designed to discount the possibility of poor performance on the 
False Belief stories resulting from task difficulty rather than impaired ToM. However, 
Langdon & Coltheart (1999) did not separately control for IQ, and it is possible that 
the group differences they found on the False Belief stories were influenced by the 
interaction between IQ and ToM that was found to be important in the present study. 
Further studies using Langdon & Coltheart’s (1999) task with non-clinical
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participants varying in schizotypy and co-varying for IQ would be beneficial to check 
if their findings are replicable.
No published studies have explored ToM in schizotypy using the Eyes Test. The 
current study did not find any significant differences in performance between high 
and low total schizotypes. Uhlhaas et al. (2006) reported impaired performance on 
the Eyes Test in a sample of individuals with schizophrenia compared to controls. 
They also calculated a composite score from performance on the Eyes Test, the Sally- 
Anne task (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983) and Hinting Task (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 
1995), which suggests that performance on these tasks was related. The Eyes Test and 
the False Belief stories in the current study did not have a significant amount of 
shared variance, indicating that they are likely to measure different aspects of ToM 
when given to healthy individuals. This highlights that ToM is a multi-faceted 
construct. A factor analytic investigation into performance on the variety of ToM 
tasks that exist would be helpful in determining the factor structure of the construct.
5.1.2 Context Processing Tasks
It was predicted that high total schizotypes would be significantly better at Block 
Design and the Hidden Figures Test than low total schizotypes as contextual 
processing deficits were expected to provide an advantage on tasks where context was 
misleading. Contrary to the study predictions, high schizotypy was associated with 
poorer performance on both context processing tasks. The present study was the first 
to examine Block Design performance and schizotypy. Block Design has previously 
been shown to be enhanced in autism relative to matched controls (Shah & Frith,
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1993) and preserved in schizophrenia relative to deficits on other subtests (Green & 
Walker, 1985), or the performance of controls (Robertson & Taylor, 1985). It is 
possible that this preserved rather than enhanced ability in schizophrenia reflects a 
weak effect of context processing deficits on Block Design task performance in the 
disorder (Pickup, 2000). This might explain why there was no significant relationship 
found between Block Design performance and schizotypy in the present study, where 
any effect may be less marked than in clinical groups.
The present study included a direct replication of Tsakanikos & Reed’s (2003) study. 
Tsakanikos & Reed (2003) reported that impaired performance on the Hidden Figures 
Test was significantly associated with the Inrovertive Anhedonia subscale of the O- 
LIFE and that enhanced performance was significantly associated with the Impulsive 
Nonconformity subscale. Compared to the present study, Tsakanikos & Reed (2003) 
had different predictions, and interpreted their findings from a different theoretical 
framework, which is considered more fully in the critical appraisal. The present study 
found no significant associations between the O-LIFE and performance on the Hidden 
Figures Test. Although Tsakanikos & Reed (2003) had a sample of one-hundred 
participants, the non-significant findings of the current study on the Hidden Figures 
Test cannot be explained due to insufficient power. An a-priori power analysis with a 
large effect size of 0.35, based on the significant effect size of 0.37 reported by 
Tsakanikos & Reed (2003), indicated that only 46 participants were required. The 
similar mean scores on the sub-scales of the O-LIFE in the two studies also discounts 
an explanation based on different distributions of sub-scale scores. Although 
Tsakanikos & Reed (2003) did not control for executive functioning, this cannot 
explain the contrasting results as the current study found executive functioning did
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not significantly predict Hidden Figures Test performance. It is difficult to establish 
other possible reasons for the non-significant findings on the Hidden Figures Test, but 
they suggest the necessity for replication of Tsakanikos & Reed’s (2003) study before 
any conclusions can be more confidently drawn from them.
5.2 Relationships between Tasks & Symptom Profiles
Performance on the ToM and context processing tasks was expected to be inversely 
related, reflecting the respective disadvantages and advantages conferred on task 
performance by impaired co-ordination of contextually relevant information (Phillips 
& Silverstein, 2003). Using a sample of individuals with schizophrenia, such a pattern 
was reported by Uhlhaas, Phillips, Schenkel & Silverstein (2006) and Schenkel, 
Spaulding & Silverstein (2005), suggesting that ToM represents a social cognitive 
form of context processing rather than a domain specific module. The current study 
did not find any statistically significant associations between performance on the 
context processing and ToM tasks. There are two main explanations for this. Firstly, it 
is possible that impaired context processing and impaired ToM are not related in 
healthy individuals, and a modular based explanation of ToM is the most appropriate. 
Alternatively, it could be that the characteristics of the particular tasks used were not 
sensitive to subtle levels of impaired context processing.
Phillips & Silverstein (2003) proposed that impaired co-ordination of contextually 
relevant information is clinically manifested in the disorganised symptoms of 
schizophrenia. It was thus hypothesised that scores on the Cognitive Disorganisation 
sub-scale of the O-LIFE would be associated with impaired performance on.the ToM
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tasks, and enhanced performance on the context processing tasks. The current study 
found no significant relationships between any sub-scales of the O-LIFE and the ToM 
or context processing tasks. Only non-verbal IQ significantly predicted ToM and 
context processing task performance. Unexpectedly, high scores on the Inrovertive 
Anhedonia (IA) sub-scale of the O-LIFE predicted good performance on the False 
Belief stories task. This seems counter intuitive as the IA subscale is the dimension 
with the greatest similarity to the social withdrawal, flat affect and few interests that 
would be associated with autism and poor ToM. Although this effect approached 
significance, it must be considered in light of the number of comparisons conducted 
and the corresponding correction in significance level required to account for Type I 
errors.
5.3 Thought Disorder
In the current study, thought disorder was assessed to extend and replicate the study 
by Uhlhaas, Silverstein, Phillips & Lovell (2004). Although they found no differences 
in context processing between high and low schizotypes overall, individuals who 
were high in both schizotypy, as measured by SPQ, and thought disorder, did 
demonstrate the expected pattern of results on the context processing tasks compared 
to high schizotypes without thought disorder and low schizotypes (who were not 
assessed for thought disorder). Uhlhaas et al. (2004) noted that it was likely to be the 
combination of high schizotypy and thought disorder that acted as a more sensitive 
marker for contextual processing deficits. Although they did not actually assess 
thought disorder in low schizotypes, they argued that it was unlikely to be thought 
disorder alone which could account for this effect as they predicted that low
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schizotypy combined with high levels of thought disorder would be a rare 
combination. The present study tested this by assessing thought disorder in both high 
and low schizotypes.
The current study found no group differences in total O-LIFE score between those 
high and low in thought disorder, replicating the finding by Uhlhaas et al. (2004).
This suggests that thought disorder and schizotypy are independent, but contrasts with 
the study by Coleman, Levy, Lenzenweger & Holzman, (1996), which found high 
schizotypes, as measured by the Perceptual Aberrations Scale (Chapman, Chapman & 
Raulin, 1978), to have higher levels of thought disorder. Like Uhlhaas et al. (2004), 
the current study did not find any group differences in Cognitive Disorganisation 
scores on the O-LIFE between those high and low in thought disorder. Given the low 
frequency of more severe categories of thought disorder in the current study, this 
suggests that thought disorder in the non-clinical population is too subtle to relate to 
features associated with Cognitive Disorganisation.
The current study did not find any group differences in ToM or context processing 
task performance when high schizotypes with thought disorder were compared to 
those with low thought disorder. The current study assessed low schizotypes for 
thought disorder, and found no significant differences in comparison to high 
schizotypes. This indicates that further investigation is required to determine the 
possible role of thought disorder in relation to schizotypy and context processing.
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5.4 Summary and Future Directions
The current study failed to find any support for the hypothesis that impaired ToM in 
high schizotypes, and by extension schizophrenia, is a function of impaired context 
processing. Rather than providing support for modular accounts of ToM, this study 
has highlighted difficulties with the tasks used to assess what is likely to be a subtle 
effect in the non-clinical population. Further extended replications are required with 
careful consideration of the best tests of ToM and context processing. This is 
important because understanding the mechanisms of impaired ToM in schizophrenia 
could help inform clinical interventions. If impaired ToM is associated with impaired 
context processing, then emphasising the contextual gestalt in social situations might 
be helpful. This could be at multiple levels, such as techniques to help process facial 
expressions and strategies to help map relationships between the different components 
of a social scenario.
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Part 3: Critical Appraisal
1. Introduction
Maintaining a reflective log has highlighted a number of interesting issues that have 
arisen at various stages throughout the research process. This critique begins by 
describing an assumption I have held about the importance of statistically significant 
results, tracing its evolution with reference to the relevant literature on the ‘file 
drawer’ effect. I then describe some of the research decisions made at a 
methodological level, considering the affordances and constraints involved. Finally, I 
explore an ethical issue that has struck me relating to research within the schizotypy 
paradigm and consider this in relation to the maladaptive versus adaptive features of 
high schizotypy and the importance of language from a social constructionist 
perspective.
2. The Importance of Significance
From the start of the research process, I held a relatively implicit assumption that a 
carefully planned and well-conducted study would produce significant results and 
ultimately, a publishable paper in a peer-reviewed journal. As the research 
progressed, this assumption became more explicit, peaking in excitement during the 
start of the analysis phase and then ending in surprisingly bitter disappointment when 
the completed analysis for all nine hypotheses produced non-significant results. This 
left me wondering whether my non-significant results were in fact ‘insignificant’ 
results of no importance or relevance.
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There are three main reasons for non-significant results. The first is that no effect was 
found because the study did not have sufficient statistical power: a Type II error. The 
second is that the study did not detect any significant effect because the methodology 
was flawed. The third is that the effect may not in fact exist at all. It is unlikely that 
the current study had insufficient power as the number of participants was calculated 
at the outset using a power analysis and the required sample size was achieved. Some 
aspects of the methodology may have been flawed. In particular, the use of Block 
Design as a test of context processing may not have been sensitive enough to pick up 
differences between high and low schizotypes, given that individuals with 
schizophrenia have been shown to have preserved rather than enhanced abilities 
(Green & Walker, 1985) on this task. The decision to use Block Design was based on 
the fact that individuals with autism have shown enhanced performance on this 
measure (Shah & Frith, 1993). Published studies have found significant results with 
healthy individuals varying in schizotypy on the Hidden Figures Test (Tsakanikos & 
Reed, 2003) and False Belief Story (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999) and with individuals 
with schizophrenia on the Eyes Test (Uhlhaas, Phillips, Schenkel & Silverstein,
2006). It was for this reason that extended replications of the above studies were 
chosen and that statistically significant results were predicted in the present sample.
Regarding the third reason for non-significant results, I wondered how many other 
studies investigating context processing and ToM in schizophrenia and schizotypy 
had also found non-significant findings, and whether there is a ‘file drawer’ problem, 
whereby results that are not statistically significant go unpublished (Dickersin, 1990). 
Studies with significant results have been shown to have increased odds of 
publication (Easterbrook, Berlin, Gopalan, & Mathews, 1991; Dickersin, Min &
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Meinert, 1992). Taken to the extreme, this tendency would suggest that a proportion 
of studies in the literature may reflect randomness resulting from Type I errors 
(Sterling, 1959). Previous research has found reviewers (Mahoney, 1987) and editors 
(Zanna, 1992) to be responsible for the absence of non-significant results in the 
literature. More recent research suggested that despite the majority of researchers 
believing journals hold an implicit policy not to publish non-significant results, more 
than half of such manuscripts submitted for publication were accepted (Reysen,
2006). This suggests that journal editors may have changed their views (Fidler, 
Thomason, Cumming, Finch & Leeman, 2004), while authors have not (Reysen, 
2006). As a means of managing the file drawer effect, Cooper (1999) proposed that 
all studies should be catalogued on a research register at the time they are initiated 
rather than when they are published. In conjunction with published studies, this would 
enable researchers to consider a broader range of research when generating 
hypotheses and considering results. There have also been calls for increased education 
about the value of non-significant results (Wilkinson & APA Task Force on Statistical 
Inference, 1999).
Having considered the above literature on the file drawer effect in psychology, I felt 
more assured that my non-significant results would not necessarily be dismissed as 
insignificant results. It also made me reflect on the ethical importance of 
disseminating non-significant results, given the time and money which could be spent 
examining previously studied topics. In this respect, access to non-significant findings 
is important to allow researchers to draw their own conclusions on the findings and to 
adapt future studies accordingly.
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3. Methodological Issues & Decisions
3.1 Participants and the Importance of Language
The word ‘schizophrenia’, and by extension ‘schizotypy’, tend to be heavily 
stigmatised words which come with a lot of negative assumptions. It is thus not 
surprising that such assumptions are likely to influence responses on questionnaires 
which incorporate these terms. Defensive responding has been cited as a possible 
explanation for the lower than expected rate of positive schizotypal characteristics 
self-reported by the relatives of individuals with schizophrenia (e. g. Yaralian et al,
2000). There is not the same type of defensive responding with negative symptoms, 
perhaps reflecting the fact that positive schizotypal symptoms are a more obvious 
characteristic of psychosis-proneness, even though negative symptoms are actually 
considered a more important determinant of genetic liability to schizophrenia 
(MacDonald et al., 2001; Tsuang et al., 2002). Mohr & Leonards (2005) investigated 
this effect of defensive responding by manipulating the information that participants 
received about a schizotypy questionnaire. Positive schizotypy scores were 
significantly higher when the schizotypy measure was couched in the context of a 
study on creativity rather than a psychiatric study. There were no differences with 
regards to negative schizotypy scores between the two groups.
Defensive responding has important implications for studies investigating schizotypy, 
emphasising the need for sensitive consideration of the context in which a study is 
presented to participants, whilst also respecting their right to accurate information. 
Equally, it is important for schizotypy researchers to be transparent in publications
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about the information participants received. This will enable the reader to consider the 
possible influence of defensive responding on any findings. In the present study, it 
was felt that the use of the term ‘personality’ was relatively neutral, not involving 
possibly negative associations with the term ‘schizotypy’ nor the positive associations 
of ‘creativity’.
3.2 Choosing Appropriate Measures
3.2.1 ToM
The current study found that performance on the False Belief stories (Langdon & 
Coltheart, 1999) and Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb,
2001) were not significantly correlated with one another, highlighting how ToM is a 
multifaceted construct. The diversity of tasks used to assess ToM in relation to 
schizophrenia has been cited as one possible reason for the lack of consistent results 
in this field (Harrington, Siegert & McClure, 2005). This emphasises the need for 
careful consideration from the outset of a study of what aspect of ToM is being 
assessed. One distinction made in the literature is between cognitive and affective or 
“cold” and “hot” ToM (Brothers & Ring, 1992), with neuropsychological evidence 
suggesting dissociation between the two (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger & Aharon- 
Peretz, 2005). According to this distinction, false belief tasks (Wimmer & Pemer, 
1983) would be considered cold ToM, as a cognitive understanding of the difference 
between two characters’ knowledge is required. In contrast, the Eyes Test, irony and 
faux pas require hot ToM as an empathic appreciation of a character’s emotional state 
is also necessary (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007).
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Reflection on our own experiences of ToM in real life settings suggests that it is a 
subtle, intuitive process that requires little explicit thought. This contrasts sharply 
with experimental manipulations designed to test ToM, which raises important 
questions about their ecological validity. Is it possible that relatively cumbersome 
ToM tasks underestimate performance in patients with schizophrenia? McCabe, 
Leudar & Antaki’s (2004) analysis of clinical interviews showed that individuals with 
schizophrenia did use ToM to communicate successfully in terms of appreciating that 
their interviewers had different beliefs from their own. Although these individuals 
were not tested on standard ToM tests, Frith (2004) predicted that many individuals 
with schizophrenia would show relatively intact ToM in their conversations, but still 
perform badly on experimental manipulations of ToM. Frith (2004) related this 
difference to the ‘on-line’ nature of ToM in natural settings compared to the ‘off-line’ 
process involved in most ToM tasks. The latter typically require an explicit, reflective 
stance on ToM which may be more impaired in schizophrenia. The development of 
more ecologically valid ‘on-line’ ToM tasks will help explore Frith’s (2004) 
hypothesis.
3.2.2 Context Processing
The choice of context processing tasks in the present study was determined by 
previous research that had found significant results in studies with participants with 
schizophrenia, autism and schizotypy. Published studies which had found significant 
effects using the schizotypy paradigm were the priority, as there was concern about 
the sensitivity of tasks to detect what was expected to be a subtle effect in a non- 
clinical population. Tsakanikos & Reed’s (2003) study reported a large effect size
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using the Hidden Figures Test. However, rather than predicting high schizotypy 
scores on the Cognitive Disorganisation sub-scale of the O-LIFE to be associated with 
enhanced Hidden Figures Test performance like the current study, they predicted 
impaired performance, particularly associated with high scores on the Introvertive 
Anhedonia sub-scale, which they hypothesised reflected impaired frontal lobe 
function. No reference in their paper was made to the literature relating schizophrenia 
and high schizotypy to contextual processing deficits, which have been shown to 
manifest in enhanced performance when tasks are used in which context is typically 
distracting (Uhlhaas & Silverstein, 2005).
The Hidden Figures test is very similar to the Embedded Figures Task (Witkin, 
Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971), in which improved performance in autism has been 
related to context processing deficits (Jarrold, Butler, Cottington & Jimenez, 2000). 
Pickup & Frith (2001) predicted that high schizotypy would be associated with 
enhanced performance on a modified version of the Embedded Figures Task (Pickup, 
1997), in which participants had to find a hidden object within a picture. The object 
was presented to participants as a cut out piece of laminated card, which participants 
could move over the picture if they wished. Pickup & Frith (2001) found no 
significant differences in accuracy or speed of performance on this task between high 
and low schizotypes. When choosing appropriate context processing tests for the 
current study, it was hypothesised that Pickup’s (1997) task might not have been 
sensitive enough to detect context processing deficits. In the Hidden Figures Test, 
participants have to choose which of five hidden shapes (present throughout the task) 
is hidden in a complex figure but the shapes cannot be cut out and moved over the 
complex figures. In this respect, it is a more challenging task. However, the current
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study’s non-significant result confirms Pickup & Frith’s (2001) study and contrasts 
with Tsakanikos & Reed’s (2003) findings. There are no identifiable methodological 
reasons for the contrast in findings between the current study and Tsakanikos & Reed
(2003). This highlights the need for further replication of Tsakanikos & Reed’s (2003) 
study.
3.2.3 Assessing Thought Disorder
The Thought and Language Index (Liddle, 2002); the Thought Disorder Index 
(Johnston & Holzman, 1979) and the short version of the Thought Disorder Index 
(Carpenter et al., 1993) were considered as possible measures when choosing how to 
assess thought disorder in the present study. The Thought and Language Index was 
designed to be shorter and easier to code than the full TDI, consisting of fewer 
categories. Although the short version of the TDI overcame the time limitations of the 
full version, it still had a difficult and cumbersome coding structure. Despite the 
Thought and Language Index being a simpler tool to administer, it was finally 
decided to use the short version of the TDI to enable extended replication of the study 
by Uhlhaas, Silverstein, Phillips & Lovell (2004).
Using this tool, coding responses according to the manual was a difficult and very 
lengthy process. It was often felt that the manual was too short and did not 
sufficiently elaborate on the various categories or provide enough examples. For 
example, the manual defines the ‘Stilted, Inappropriate Expression’ category as 
“awkwardly phrased and stilted sounding expressions” and gives the following 
example: “What suggested it? [experimenter] Just its overall picture [participant]”. I
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don’t think it is clear what is stilted or awkward about this example. Cases like this 
meant that I had to develop my own rules to determine what I thought could be 
considered slightly unusual about such examples so that the same rule could be 
applied to similar instances. In the above example, I felt it was the way in which the 
response was vague, and not explicitly related to particular aspects of the stimulus 
that meant it could be considered ‘Stilted and Inappropriate’. It was also necessary for 
me to explicitly formalise such rules in response to vagueness in the manual in order 
to train my second coder. This process undoubtedly contributed towards the high level 
of inter-rater reliability achieved, but also highlights how this will reflect my own 
subjective interpretations of ambiguities in the manual, which were taught to the 
second coder. Although not acknowledged, other researchers must have encountered 
the same difficulties. This means that they too will have had to develop their own 
rules to manage instances of vagueness in the manual. It is possible that variety in 
such rules between researchers results in thought disorder being recorded differently 
across studies. This problem could be resolved by a more elaborated manual or 
standardised training programmes in using the measure.
Once half of the TDI data had been second coded, I had to find the best way of 
calculating the inter-rater reliability. The Kappa statistic is often used to rate the 
degree of agreement between raters for categorical data. Kappa’s calculation uses a 
term called the ‘proportion of chance agreement’, which is interpreted as the 
proportion of times raters would agree by chance alone. However, there were 
practical and conceptual problems with applying this method to the thought disorder 
data. Practically speaking, each participant’s data set could vary along several 
dimensions that would need to be considered including the total number of responses;
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the total number of thought disordered responses; the category of each thought 
disordered response; their severity; and whether the same speech utterance was 
identified as thought disordered. As the total number of responses is continuous and 
not categorical, inter-rater agreement for this variable would have to be determined 
using the interclass correlation coefficient. Kappa statistics would then have to be 
calculated for each of the categorical variables, and then an average of all these 
calculations made. This would have been likely to inflate the degree of concordance 
as it is the simultaneous occurrence of all these variables that is important.
Conceptually, the validity of the Kappa statistic as a ‘chance-corrected’ measure has 
been questioned, as this is only relevant under conditions of statistical independence 
of the raters (Maclure & Willet, 1987). Raters are clearly dependent if they have been 
trained to rate the same phenomenon. Given these practical and conceptual 
difficulties, it was decided to report the interclass correlation coefficient for the 
agreement for the total number of ideas expressed (as this is used in calculating the 
total thought disorder index score), and to report the percentage agreement between 
raters for the co-occurrence of the categorical variables.
3.3 Controlling for Confounding Variables: The Potential Importance o f Mood
The current study controlled for IQ and executive functioning in relation to task 
performance, but the potential role of mood was not considered at the design phase. 
However, it is possible that mood may interact with context processing. Positive 
mood and optimism have been associated with a global bias and inversely related to a 
local bias, while individuals with depression and trait anxiety have been related to a
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tendency for a local processing style (Basso, Schefft, Ris & Dember, 1996). Similarly, 
trait anxiety has been associated with enhanced left hemisphere activation during 
negative emotional states, which in turn facilitates local perceptual information 
processing (Derryberry & Reed, 1998). In this respect, depression and anxiety may 
interact with context processing deficits to confer an even greater advantage on 
context processing tasks. If ToM is also a form of context processing, then mood 
could also impair performance on ToM tasks. Anecdotally, there were no obvious 
indicators of the impact of mood on performance in the present study. However, 
subtle influences of mood with non-clinical samples should be considered in future, 
and this is likely to be even more important with clinical samples where levels of co- 
morbid anxiety and depression would be higher.
4. Schizotypy: Maladaptive versus Adaptive Functioning
High schizotypy, particularly variables related to perceptual aberration, magical 
ideation and social anhedonia, have been identified as good indicators for proneness 
to psychosis (Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckbald & Zinser, 1994). As risk factors 
for psychosis have been associated with the need for targeted early intervention 
programmes (Olin & Mednick, 1996), I have wondered whether researchers have an 
ethical obligation to inform high schizotypes of the potential risk associated with their 
personality traits. Such advice would certainly be likely to cause alarm, and could also 
be misplaced without a thorough understanding of genetic and environmental 
precursors to psychosis likely to interact with individual traits. Olin & Mednick 
(1996) suggested that risk factors be combined to form a multiple risk index to help 
target early intervention programmes. Assessing the contribution of personality traits
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to such an index might be most appropriate when there is already good evidence for 
existing genetic and environmental risk factors. In the absence of such complex data, 
and more importantly, participants’ explicit consent, such information could be more 
damaging than helpful.
Discussing high schizotypy in relation to psychosis proneness suggests that it is an 
undesirable feature synonymous to a deficit or impairment. However, high 
schizotypy, particularly positive schizotypy, has also been associated with creativity 
(e. g. Schuldberg, 2000), which helps explain why relatives of individuals with 
psychosis have a higher incidence of creative achievement (Brod, 1997). Equally, 
high schizotypy has been associated with enhanced spirituality (Fisher et al., 2004). 
For example, schizotypy items such as “It has seemed as if my body is melting into 
my surroundings” are experiences reported by those who practice meditation (Kabat- 
Zinn, 1990).
Contextual processing “deficits” found in high schizotypy and schizophrenia can also 
be considered with regards to adaptive consequences. Within the field of autism, it 
was suggested that weak central coherence represented a ‘cognitive style’ rather than 
a deficit (Firth, 1989; Happe, 1999), as it provided advantages in situations where a 
local information processing bias was required. In real life settings this has been 
related to advantages in fields such as engineering, mathematics and physics (Baron 
Cohen et al., 1997), suggesting that high schizotypy might also have similar benefits. 
This has important implications for clinical interventions based on context processing 
‘deficits’ in psychosis. Although it may be beneficial to consider the possible role of 
contextual processing ‘deficits’ in interventions aimed at improving ToM, it also
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suggests that equal consideration should be given to identifying relative strengths that 
an individual’s cognitive style affords.
Acknowledgement of adaptive affordances in addition to maladaptive constraints is 
important, and has made me think about the need for a sensitive use of language in 
research and clinical contexts, particularly given the power of words when considered 
from a social constructionist perspective (Walker, 2006). Although superficially 
subtle, I don’t think differences between linguistic nuances such as “deficit” and 
“cognitive style” should be dismissed as ‘political correctness gone mad’, but rather 
encouraged as opportunities to acknowledge the diversity of experiences that exist on 
a continuum. Although I have used the word ‘deficit’ in relation to context processing 
throughout this thesis, I have decided to leave it as such to help show the evolution of 
ideas encouraged by the process of reflection and reflexivity. However, I hope that 
any potential publication and my future practice will be informed by such ideas.
5. Conclusions
Two principal themes have emerged from this critical appraisal. The first concerns 
attitudes towards statistically non-significant results. There is undoubtedly a general 
sense in which non-significant results are met with disappointment and as a sign of 
failure. However, the literature on the ‘file drawer’ effect highlights the importance of 
non-significant results from methodologically sound studies. The present study failed 
to replicate two published studies. This emphasises the need for further extended 
replications, and for careful consideration of methodological choices such as how to 
measure ToM, context processing and thought disorder.
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The second theme concerns language. The autism literature typically demonstrates a 
use of language which could be described as ‘person centred’. There is a sensitive 
awareness of the power of words. The schizophrenia/schizotypy literature seems to 
lack a similar degree of awareness, using a language which often appears ‘disorder 
centred’. Addressing the use of language, and more importantly, the thoughts, beliefs 
and ideas that language conveys, could help address issues such as stigma by 
acknowledging individual differences in less stigmatising ways.
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Appendix 1
Schizotypal Personality Scale (STA; Claridge & Broks, 1984)
STA SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE -CONFIDENTIAL
Please answer each question by circling Y or N.
1. Do you believe in telepathy?
Y N
2. Do you often feel that other people have it in for you?
Y N
3. When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms, even though there’s 
nothing there?
Y N
4. If you say you will do something, do you always keep your promise no matter 
how inconvenient it might be?
Y N
5. Does your own voice ever seem distant, faraway?
Y N
6. Does it often happen that almost every thought immediately and automatically 
suggests an enormous number of ideas?
Y N
7. Do you ever become over sensitive to light or noise?
Y N
8. Were you ever greedy by helping yourself to more than your share of 
anything?
Y N
9. Do you often have vivid dreams that disturb your sleep?
Y N
10. When you are worried or anxious do you have trouble with your bowels?
Y N
11. Have you ever felt when you looked in a mirror that your face seemed 
different?
Y N
12. Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you knew was really 
your fault?
Y N
13. Do you think it is safer to trust nobody?
Y N
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14. Do things sometimes feel as if they were not real?
Y N
15. Do you feel lonely most of the time even when you’re with people?
Y N
16. Are all your habits good and desirable ones?
Y N
17. Do everyday things sometimes seem unusually large or small?
Y N
18. Are you often bothered by the feeling that people are watching you?
Y N
19. Do you feel that you cannot get ‘close’ to other people?
Y N
20. Have you ever taken anything (even a pin or a button) that belonged to 
someone else?
Y N
21. Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already 
gathered and are talking?
Y N
22. Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong?
Y N
23. Are you sometimes sure that other people can tell what you are thinking?
Y N
24. Have you ever broken or lost something belonging to someone else?
Y N
25. Have you ever had the sensation of your body or part of it changing shape?
Y N
26. Do you ever feel sure that something is about to happen even though there 
doesn’t seem to be any reason for your thinking that?
Y N
27. Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are not 
normally aware of?
Y N
28. Have you ever said anything bad or nasty about anyone?
Y N
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29. Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that 
you do not understand?
Y N
30. Have you ever thought you heard people talking only to discover that it was in 
fact some nondescript noise?
Y N
31. Do your thoughts ever stop suddenly causing you to interrupt what you’re 
saying?
Y N
32. As a child were you ever cheeky to your parents?
Y N
33. Do you feel that you have to be on guard even with your friends?
Y N
34. Do you feel that your thoughts don’t belong to you?
Y N
35. When in a crowded room do you often have difficulty in following a 
conversation?
Y N
36. Have you ever cheated at a game?
Y N
37. Do you sometimes feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces?
Y N
38. Do you feel at times that people are talking about you?
Y N
39. Do you believe that dreams can come true?
Y N
40. Have you ever taken advantage of someone?
Y N
41. Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words 
are all mixed up and don’t make sense?
Y N
42. Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them?
Y N
43. When coming into a new situation, have you ever felt strongly that it was a 
repeat of something that has happened before?
Y N
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44. Do you always practice what you preach? 
Y N
45. Have you ever felt that you were communicating with another person 
telepathically?
Y N
46. Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams?
Y N
47. Are you very hurt by criticism?
Y N
48. Do you sometimes put off until tomorrow what you ought to do today?
Y N
49. Do you ever get nervous when someone is walking behind you?
Y N
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Appendix 2
The Oxford-liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et
a l, 1995).
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Please read these instructions before completing the questionnaire:
These questions relate to your thoughts, feelings, experiences and preferences. There 
are no right or wrong answers or trick questions so please be as honest as possible.
For each question please choose either YES or NO and circle this on the form._____
1. Do you often hesitate when you are going to say something in a 
group of people whom you more or less know? Yes No
2. Do you often overindulge in alcohol or food? Yes No
3. Are the sounds you hear in your daydreams really clear and 
distinct?
Yes No
4. Do you enjoy many different kinds of play and recreation? Yes No
5. Do your thoughts sometimes seem as real as actual events in 
your life?
Yes No
6. Does it often happen that nearly every thought immediately and 
automatically suggests an enormous number of ideas?
Yes No
7. When in a group of people do you usually prefer to let someone 
else be the centre of attention?
Yes No
8. Do you frequently have difficulty in starting to do things? Yes No
9. Has dancing or the idea of it always seemed dull to you? Yes No
10. When you catch a train do you often arrive at the last minute? Yes No
11. Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed? Yes No
12. Do you often change between intense liking and disliking of 
the same person?
Yes No
13. Have you ever cheated at a game? Yes No
14. Are there very few things that you have ever really enjoyed 
doing?
Yes No
15. Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or 
shocking?
Yes No
16. Do you often worry about things you should not have done or 
said?
Yes No
17. Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost 
hear them?
Yes No
18. Are you usually in an average sort of mood, not too high and 
not too low?
Yes No
19. Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous 
effects?
Yes No
20. Do you think you could learn to read other's minds if you 
wanted to?
Yes No
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21. When in a crowded room, do you often have difficulty in 
following a conversation?
Yes No
22. No matter how hard you try to concentrate do unrelated 
thoughts creep into your mind?
Yes No
23. Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you or the 
work you do?
Yes No
24. Do you stop to think things over before doing anything? Yes No
25. Have you ever felt that you have special, almost magical 
powers?
Yes No
26. Are you much too independent to really get involved with 
other people?
Yes No
27. Do ideas and insights sometimes come to you so fast that you 
cannot express them all?
Yes No
28. Do you easily lose your courage when criticised or failing in 
something?
Yes No
29. Can some people make you aware of them just by thinking 
about you?
Yes No
30. Does a passing thought ever seem so real it frightens you? Yes No
31. Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you 
know was really your fault?
Yes No
32. Are you a person whose mood goes up and down easily? Yes No
33. Does your voice ever seem distant or faraway? Yes No
34. Do you think having close friends is not as important as some 
people say?
Yes No
35. Are you rather lively? Yes No
36. Are you sometimes so nervous that you are 'blocked'? Yes No
37. Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for 
a long time?
Yes No
38. Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other 
people have already gathered and are talking?
Yes No
39. Does it often feel good to massage your muscles when they are 
tired or sore?
Yes No
40. Do you sometimes feel that your accidents are caused by 
mysterious forces?
Yes No
41. Do you like mixing with people? Yes No
42. On seeing a soft thick carpet have you sometimes had the 
impulse to take off your shoes and walk barefoot on it?
Yes No
43. Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts? Yes No
44. Do the people in your daydreams seem so true to life that you Yes No
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sometimes think they are real?
45. Are people usually better off if they stay aloof from emotional 
involvements with people?
Yes No
46. Can just being with friends make you feel really good? Yes No
47. Is your hearing sometimes so sensitive that ordinary sounds 
become uncomfortable?
Yes No
48. Have you often felt uncomfortable when your friends touch 
you?
Yes No
49. When things are bothering you do you like to talk to other 
people about it?
Yes No
50. Do you have many friends? Yes No
51. Would being in debt worry you? Yes No
52. Do you think people spend too much time safeguarding their 
future with savings and insurance?
Yes No
53. Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things? Yes No
54. Do you often feel that there is no purpose to life? Yes No
55. Do you worry about awful things that might happen? Yes No
56. Have you ever felt the urge to injure yourself? Yes No
57. Would it make you nervous to play the clown in front of other 
people?
Yes No
58. Have you felt that you might cause something to happen just 
by thinking too much about it?
Yes No
59. Have you had very little fun from physical activities like 
walking, swimming, or sports?
Yes No
60. Do you feel so good at controlling others that it sometimes 
scares you?
Yes No
61. Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams? Yes No
62. Are you easily confused if too much happens at the same time? Yes No
63. Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for 
reasons that you do not understand?
Yes No
64. Is it true that your relationships with other people never get 
very intense?
Yes No
65. Have you sometimes had the feeling of gaining or losing 
energy when certain people look at you or touch you?
Yes No
66. Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience? Yes No
67. Do you love having your back massaged? Yes No
68. Do you consider yourself to be pretty much an average kind of 
person?
Yes No
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69. Have you ever taken advantage of someone? Yes No
70. Would you like other people to be afraid of you? Yes No
71. Have you ever thought you heard people talking only to 
discover that it was in fact some nondescript noise?
Yes No
72. Have you occasionally felt as though your body did not exist? Yes No
73. Do you often feel lonely? Yes No
74. Do you often have an urge to hit someone? Yes No
75. Do you often experience an overwhelming sense of emptiness? Yes No
76. On occasions, have you seen a person's face in front of you 
when no one was in fact there?
Yes No
77. Is it fun to sing with other people? Yes No
78. Do you often have days when indoor lights seem so bright that 
they bother your eyes?
Yes No ,
79. Have you wondered whether the spirits of the dead can 
influence the living?
Yes No
80. Do people who try to get to know you better usually give up 
after a while?
Yes No
81. Do you often feel 'fed up'? Yes No
82. Have you felt as though your head or limbs were somehow not 
your own?
Yes No
83. When you look in the mirror does your face sometimes seem 
quite different from usual?
Yes No
84. Do people who drive carefully annoy you? Yes No
85. Would you call yourself a nervous person? Yes No
86. Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively 
party?
Yes No
87. Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that 
you are not normally aware of?
Yes No
88. Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about? Yes No
89. When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even 
though there's nothing there?
Yes No
90. Have you sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, even 
though you could not see it?
Yes No
91. Is it hard for you to make decisions? Yes No
92. Do you find the bright lights of a city exciting to look at? Yes No
93. Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong? Yes No
94. Do you usually have very little desire to buy new kinds of 
food?
Yes No
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95. Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand 
because the words are all mixed up and don't make sense?
Yes No
96. Do you often feel like doing the opposite of what other people 
suggest, even though you know they are right?
Yes No
97. Do you like going out a lot? Yes No
98. Do you feel very close to your friends? Yes No
99. Do you ever feel sure that something is about to happen, even 
though there does not seem to be any reason for you thinking that?
Yes No
100. Do you often feel the impulse to spend money which you 
know you can't afford?
Yes No
101. Are you easily distracted when you read or talk to someone? Yes No
102. Do you feel that making new friends isn’t worth the energy it 
takes?
Yes No
103. Do you believe in telepathy? Yes No
104. Do you prefer watching television to going out with other 
people?
Yes No
Thank you very much for taking the time and effort to fill this in.
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Appendix 3 
The Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et a t, 2001)
practice
panickedjealous
arrogant hateful
Appendix 4
Picture-Story Sequencing Task (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999)
False Belief Story Example
s*'
Social Script Story Example
COFFEE
SHOP
Mechanical Story Example
s  9 1 A S H
Capture Story Example
— p. ING —
*
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Appendix 5 
Hidden Figures Test (Ekstom et al., 1976)
HIDDEN FIGURES TEST —  CF-1 (R e v .)
T his i s  a t e s t  c f  your a b i l i ty  tc  t e l l  vhic'r. one c f  fiv e  simple f ig u r e s  
can be found in  a so re  complex p a tte rn .  At the top o f each page in th is  t e s t  
are fiv e  simple fig u res l e t te r e d  A, 2 , C, D, and S . Beneath each row cf 
figu res i s  a page of p a tte rn s .  Each p a tte rn  has a row o f l e t t e r s  beneath i t .  
In d ica te  your answer by p u ttin g  an X through the l e t t e r  o f the  figure which 
you fin d  in  the p a tte rn .
NOT5 : There is  only one of these  fig u res  in  each p a tte rn ,  and th is
figu re  w ill  always be r ig h t  side  up and ex ac tly  th e  same s iz e  as one of the  
fiv e  le t te re d  fig u re s .
Nov try  these 2 examples.
A B C 0  E
A B C D E A B O D E
The fig u res below show hew the fig u res are included  in  the p robl'.ns. 
Figure A i s  ir. the f i r s t  problem and figure  I) in  th e  second .
X b c d e  a b c X e
Your score on th ic  t e s t  w i l l  be the number marked c o r re c tly  ciir.us a
f ra c t io n  of the number marked in c o r re c t ly . T h ere fo re , i t  w i l l  not be to
your advantage to  guess un less you are able tc  e lim in a te  one or more of the 
answer choices as wrong.
You w ill have 12 m inutes fo r  each o f the two p a r t s  o f  t h i s  t e s t .
Each p a r t  has 2 pages. When you have f in ish ed  P a r t  1, STOP. Please
do not go on to  Part 2 u n t i l  you a re  asked to  do so .
DO HOT TjRJI THIS PAGE UNTIL ASKED TO DO SO.
C opyrigh t ^ ^ 1 9 6 2 ,  1975 by E d u c a tio n a l T e stin g  S e r v ic e .  A l l  r ig h t s  re s e rv e d .
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Appendix 6
Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form
Participant Information Sheet
Study Title: Relations between personality, theory of mind and cognitive style
Investigators: Dr Graham Pickup, Department of Clinical Health
Psychology, UCL, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT 
Tel: 
Omar Cummins, Department of Clinical Health 
Psychology, UCL, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT 
Tel: 
You are invited to participate in a research project investigating the relationship between 
personality, the ability to work out what others are thinking and the way in which 
information from the environment is put together.
We are looking for volunteers who have English as their first language and who have no 
history of psychiatric illness or head injury. As a healthy volunteer, the data you provide 
will give us information about the processes involved in understanding social situations in 
the general population. This in turn will help us understand what happens when things 
are not working properly in clinical populations.
You will be asked to complete a brief screening questionnaire asking about some of your 
experiences and thoughts. After you have completed it, you will be told whether or not 
you are eligible to take part in the study.
If you take part, you will be asked to complete a personality questionnaire; answer 
questions on some cartoon stories; describe the similarities between pairs of words and 
the meanings of words; complete a pattern sequencing task; find some hidden objects 
within pictures; complete a spatial sequencing task; complete a jigsaw puzzle task and 
say what comes to mind in response to four picture cards. This latter task will be 
recorded onto audio tape and later transcribed by the experimenter. The maximum time 
taken for these tasks is 120 minutes.
You will be paid £12.00 for taking part.
There are no potential risks involved in this research.
All data will be collected and stored in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1988. 
Participants will be given an identifying code so that analyses can be conducted and 
written up anonymously. Paper, electronic and audio data records will be stored securely. 
Data will be kept until it has been accepted for publication after which it will be destroyed.
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not want to. If you decide to 
take part, you may withdraw at anytime without having to give a reason.
This study has been approved by the University College London Committee on the 
Ethics of Non-NHS Human Research.
Please feel free to ask the above researchers any questions.
Many thanks for considering taking part in this study. It is much appreciated!
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Informed Consent Form
Relationships between personality, theory of mind and cognitive style 
Please read each item below and tick the relevant box.
Sign and date the form.
Have you read the Participant Information Sheet?
YES NO
Has the project been explained to you orally?
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the 
study?
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?
Have you received enough information about the study? 
Who have you spoken to?..................................
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study 
without penalty at any stage?
Do you agree with the publication of the results of this study in a 
peer reviewed journal?
Do you agree to have an audio record made of your responses to part 
of the study?
Comment or Concerns During the Study
If you have any comments or concerns you should discuss these with the 
Principal Researcher. If you wish to go further and complain about any aspect of 
the way you have been approached or treated during the course of the study, you 
should email the Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee 
(gradschoolhead@ucl.ac.uk) or send a letter to: The Graduate School, North 
Cloisters, Wilkins Building, UCL, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT who will 
take the complaint forward as necessary.
Signed:........................................................................................Date:
Full Name in Capitals: 
Date of Birth.................
Signature of Witness:..............................................................Date:
Full Name In Capitals:
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Appendix 7 
Ethical Approval Confirmation Letter
UCL GRADUATE SCHOOL
Dr Graham Pickup
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology 
UCL
Gower Street
15 March 2006
Dear Dr Pickup
Re: Notification of Ethical Approval
Re: Ethics Application:  Relationships between theory of mind, personality and cognitive style
I am pleased to confirm that following die review of your application by the Chair of the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee the above research has been given ethical approval for the duration of the project.
Approval is subject to the following conditions:
1. You must seek Chair's approval for proposed amendments to the research for which this approval has been 
given. Ethical approval is specific to this project and must not be treated as applicable to research of a 
similar nature. Each research project is reviewed separately and if there are significant changes to the 
research protocol you should seek confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the Amendment 
Approval Request Form'.
The form identified above can be accessed by logging on to the ethics website homepage: 
http://www.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ethics/ and clicking on the button marked Key Responsibilities of the Researcher 
Following Approval’.
2. It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving 
risks to participants or others. Both non-serious and serious adverse events must be reported.
Reporting Non-Serious Adverse Events
For non-serious adverse events you will need to inform Ms Helen Dougal, Ethics Committee Administrator 
(h.dougal@ucl.ac.uk), within ten days of an adverse incident occurring and provide a full written report that 
should include any amendments to the participant information sheet and study protocol. The Chair or 
Vice-Chair of the Ethics Committee will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee 
at the next meeting. The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you
Reporting Serious Adverse Events
The Ethics Committee should be notified of all serious adverse events via the Ethics Committee 
Administrator immediately the incident occurs. Where the adverse incident is unexpected and serious, the 
Chair or Vice-Chair will decide whether the study should be terminated pending the opinion of an 
independent expert The adverse event will be considered at the next Committee meeting and a decision 
will be made on the need to change the information leaflet and/or study protocol.
UCL Graduate School, North Cloister*, Wilkins Building 
University College London Gower Street London WC1E 6BT 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 7844 Fax. +44(0)20 7679 7043 
h.dougal@ucl.ac.uk 
www uci.ac uk/gradschool
Letter to Dr Pickup 15/3/2006
On completion of the research you must submit a brief report (a maximum of two sides of A4) of your 
findings/concluding comments to the Committee, which includes in particular issues relating to the ethical 
implications of the research.
Youre sincerely
Sir John Birch
Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee
Cc: Omar Cummins, Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology, UCL
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